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I. INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of animals, whether such animals are used for food 
production, entertainment, or companionship has generated a significant 
amount of attention over the last few decades. 1 For many people, their 
l. Michael Pollan, An Animal's Place, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 58 
(discussing the growth and influence of the animal rights movement), available at LEXIS, News 
Library, New York Times File. Consideration of animal rights and welfare issues is of increasing 
interest to attorneys as well. A number of law schools have recently included animal law courses 
as part of their curriculum. Steven M. Wise, Liberty and Equality, NAT'L L.J., Aug~ 12, 2002, at 
A19 (stating that "[t]wenty-five American law schools, including Harvard, offer animal law 
classes, as do law schools in Britain, Holland and Australia''). Animal law sections and 
committees are being formed under the auspices of state and local bar associations. Stephanie 
Davis, Lawyers: Pets Have Place in Court: New York Latest in String of States To Formalize 
Legal Committee Dedicated to Animal Well-being, DVM NEWSMAG., Sept. 1, 2002 (discussing 
the fonnation of a committee in the New York Bar Association and other committees and 
sections in bar associations across the United States), available at http:// 
www .dvmnewsmagazine.cornldvm/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=31522 (last visited Mar. 24, 2004); 
Adam Karp, Lex Feles et Canis Beyond Ferae Naturae: Practicing Animal Law in Washington, 
WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Feb. 2003, at 16 (discussing practicing animal law in Washington and 
the establishment of an animal law section of the Washington State Bar Association), available at 
http://www. wsba.org/media/publicationslbarnews/2003/feb-03-beyond.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2004). For an overview of some of the philosophical views on the treatment of animals, see 
Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man·s and Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Sta.tus of 
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focus is on the animals that they interact with on a daily basis their 
animal companions. There is a growing body of literature on the 
positive impact on human health attributed to interaction with 
companion animals. 2 Companion animals are used as part of the 
treatment for some types of mental illness.3 Studies have been 
conducted to learn the impact on children of having companio·n animals 
in their hornes.4 
Many people consider animal companions as part of the family. 5 The 
role of these animals as family members has become progressively 
more important over tirne.6 The relationship between people and 
companion animals has changed from one of utility to one of affection 
and companionship.7 In some households, these animals are viewed in 
ways similar to that of human children .. 8 
Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 47, 52-68 (2002) [hereinafter Huss, Companion Animal 
Status]. 
2. COMPANION ANIMALS IN HUMAN HEALTH (Cindy C. Wilson & Dennis C. Turner eds., 
1998) (discussing a variety of studies done on the impact of companion animals in human health). 
Research shows that physical contact with companion animals has a calming effect on people and 
can decrease blood pressure. Aaron H. Katcher, How Companion Animals Make Us Feel 
(discussing how visual and physical contact with animals induces calm and reporting human 
physiological changes during interactions with pets), in PERCEPTIONS OF ANIMALS IN AMERICAN 
CULTIJRE 113, 120, 123 (R.J. Hoage ed., 1980). One study even found that people with 
companion animals had lower cholesterol and triglycerides. ALAN M. BECK & AARON HONORl 
KATCHER, BETWEEN PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP 7 
(1996). 
3. Elizabeth Blandon, Reasonable Accommodation or Nuisance? Service Animals for the 
Disabled, FLA. B.J ., Mar. 2001, at 12. Although the use of service dogs to assist persons with 
physical disabilities is well known, recently the use of animals to help persons with mental 
disabilities such as depression, panic disorder, and bipolar disorder has generated attention. /d. at 
14; see also GAIL F. MELSON, WHY THE WILD THINGS ARE: ANIMALS IN THE LIVES OF 
CHILDREN 99-131 (2001) (discussing the use of animals in therapy with children). 
4. See generally MELSON, supra note 3 (discussing the relationship between animals and 
children and the impact of contact with animals on children). Recent studies indicate that the 
presence of animals in a home actually decreases the risk of children having allergies later in life. 
Delthia Ricks, Early Exposure to Pets May Put Leash on Allergies Immunology, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2002, at S3 (discussing a recent study that found that exposure to at least two dogs or cats 
during the first year of life might drastically reduce the risk of allergies), available. at 2002 WL 
2500873. 
5. AM. PET PRODS. MFRS. ASS'N, 2003-2004 APPMA NATIONAL PET OWNERS SURVEY, at 
xxxiii (2003) (reporting that in a recent poll, 70% of people with dogs and 62% of people with 
cats agreed with the. statement that the companion animals in their households were like children 
or family members); see also Katcher, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing studies that find thatpets 
are viewed as "members of the family"). 
6. See Katcher, supra note 2, at 123 (citing to the studies that show that fewer people are 
having children and that there are fewer children in families). 
7. For a discussion on the domestication of animals and the changing role of animals in the 
United States, see MELSON, supra note 3, at 19, and Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody and 
Estate Planning Issues Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 188-95 
(2003) [hereinafter Huss, Companion Animal Issues]. There are many factors that contributed to 
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A significant amount of money is spent on companion animals in the 
United States. There are estimates that approximately thirty billion 
dollars are spent each year on the care of these animals.9 Daily 
expenses include the cost of day care or pet sitting services. 10 People 
spend time with their canines in special dog parks-that include off-leash 
areas to enable dogs to socialize freely with one another. 11 Vacations 
the development of this new paradigm in the relationship between people and companion 
animals. Melson cites the effects of urbanization, industrialization, and isolation of modem 
society as reasons for the new relationship. MELSON, supra note 3, at 25-31; see also Leslie 
Mann, Celebrating a Pet's Love, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2000, at 5 (reporting on the changing 
perspective of dogs as utility animals to dogs as members of families), available at 2000 WL 
3633646. 
8. BECK & KATCHER, supra note 2, at 41 (citing the analogous treatment of children and 
companion animals). Although sometimes companion animals are viewed as child substitutes, 
pets are often present in households with children. MELSON, supra note 3, at 17 (stating that pets 
live in ''at least 75% of all American households With children';). Pet ownership increases as 
children enter· elementary school. /d. at 32; see also Sandra Block, Pet Insurance Can Save 
Owners from Wrenching Decisions, USA TODAY, Feb. 19; 2002, at B3 (citing to survey that 
found that 78% of people "thi,nk of their pets as their children"), available at 2002 WL 4719848. 
9. Stephanie Fagnani, Animal Magnetism; As No. 2, Grocers Must Work Harder To Sell Pet 
ProductsJ by Stocking More Variety, Pricing Competitively, Even Holding Adoption Events To 
Spur Sales, SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 10, 2002, at 29 (stating that expenditures in the pet 
industry are projected to be $29.5 billion in 2002 and $31 billion in 2003); see also Azell ~1urphy 
Cavaan, Animal Magnetism-Doggone It! Americans Have a Soft Spot for Their Pets, BOSTON 
HERALD, June 27, 2001, at 56 (stating that in 2001, Americans spent over $28.5 billion on their 
companion animals), available at 2001 WL 3804535. Sales of pharmaceuticals for animals (food 
producing and companion) increased 4.5o/o from 2000 to 2001, reaching $3.2 million. David 
Ranii, Sniffing Out Discomfort, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Sept. 10, 2002, at Dl, 
available at 2002 WL 11737062. 
10. Dog sitting services can be used when a family is out of town or on a daily basis; a dog (or 
cat) sitter comes to the home and walks, feeds, and otherwise interacts with an animal. Generally 
for day care the animal is dropped off (or in some cases picked up and taken to a central location) 
to interact w-ith othe.r dogs and caretakers. Dave Ford, Bark and Ride~· Pet Taxi Fills Void in 
Driver's Life, Clients' Schedules, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 2, 2001, at l, available at 2001 WL 
3393992. The cost of these services varies considerabfy based on the geographic location and 
level of care. Beth Dolan, Yappy Days, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 23, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 
5497110. There are organizations that provide infonnation about sitters in various geographic 
areas. See, e.g., PETSiriERS.COM, FIND A SITIER, at http://www.petsitters.com (last visited Feb. 
20, 2004); see also Betsy Cook Donahue, Dog Days: If It Is a Dog;s Life, It's a Pretty Good One 
These Days, CHARLESTON GAZE'1TE, Feb. 16, 2000, at PID (stating that 27% of customers in a 
recent PETsMART survey said that they take their pets to day care), available at 2000 WL 
2593104. 
11. Talk of the Nation: Designated Parks for Dogs (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 28, 2001), 
transcript available at 2001 WL 4190091; see also Brian E. Clark, Dog Park Is Possible for 
Rancho Bernardo: Council's Maienschein Working on Project, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRlB., Oct. 
20, 200 I, at NI 1, available at 2001 WL 27295723; Robert E. Misseck, Dogs Get a Place To 
Roam at Echo lnke, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 9, 2001, at 37; Eileen Rivers, At New 
Park, Every Dog Has His Play; Quiet Waters Opens Canine Rumpus Room, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 
2001, at T03, available at 2001 WL 30330688; Dina Sanchez, Talk of Dog Park Perks Ears in 
Winter Springs; Group Wants One Even More Fetching than Sanford's, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Dec~ 21, 2001, at G1, available .at 2001 WL 28430360; Annie Sweeney, Lincoln Parkers Want 
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can now include the entire family, human and non-human, with 
resources available to find pet friendly hotels and resorts or even camps 
where humans and their dogs can go to train and bond. 12 If animals 
must be left behind, the animals are not left in stark kennels but are now 
boarded at "retreats" that provide individualized care and color 
television for discriminating viewers. 13 
Just as with other family members, when an animal is ill, its owners 
take it to a medical professional a veterinarian. One survey indicated 
that 91 % of pet owners take their dogs or cats to a veterinarian 
regularly. 14 Although the level of care can range significantly, one poll 
found that the average number of visits to a veterinarian per year was 
Place for Their Dogs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at 23, available at 2001 WL 7243054; 
Fred Swegles, Dogs Will Get Their Day in City's Parks: Council Approves Creating a Place for 
Pooches Only, Access to Three Parks, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 12, 2001, at Cover, available 
at 2001 WL 9687382. 
12. CRUDEN BAY BOOKS, HIKE WITH YOUR DOG, at http://www.hikewithyourdog.com (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2004) (providing links to parks that allow dogs); TRAVEL PETS, WELCOME TO 
TRAVEL PETS, at http://www.travelpets.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) (providing travel tips and 
listing inns that allow pets); Devin Rose, Camp Dogwood, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2001, at C 1 
(discussing a dog camp north of Chicago and other dog camps), available at 200 I WL 4132169. 
Traveling to a vacation spot has become safer for dogs and cats with a new airline that has been 
established to transport companion animals in cabins rather than in cargo compartments. See 
COMPANIONAIR AIR CORP., WHAT WE DO, at http:// 
www.companionair.com/whatwedo.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) (stating that it is the first 
airline created for pets and their owners, with discounts on fare prices for human clients). 
13. Allan Turner, Dogs Livin' It Up: Pooches Get the Best Their Owners' Money Can Buy, 
Hous. CHRON., Feb. II, 2001, at 35 (discussing boarding and other costs relating to the care of 
companion animals), available at 2001 WL 2998484; see, e.g., ALL FOR DOGGIES, L.L.C., 
WELCOME TO ALLFOROOGGIES.COM, at http://www.allfordoggies.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) 
(describing products and services, including deluxe boarding, with webcams showing daycare 
facilities where canine boarders spend their days); CITIZEN CANINE, CITIZEN CANINE BED & 
BREAKFAST FOR DOGS, at http://www.citizencaninechicago.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) 
(featuring no cage boarding). If animals are left behind, 44o/o can expect a vacation souvenir 
upon the family's return. Melissa Draper, Family Ties Extend To Include Pets, NEWS AND 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 27, 2001, at N4 (citing to a survey by the American Animal 
Hospital Association), available at 200 l WL 3462468. 
14. Christine Winter, Pet Health Insurance Plans Grow by Leaps and Bounds, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 26, 2000, at lA, available at 2000 WL 5648771. One reason for the 
regular visits to veterinarians is the requirement that dogs (and sometimes cats) be vaccinated 
against rabies pursuant to state law. See JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE 
VETERINARY PROFESSION 79-80 (1988). Unlike childhood vaccinations that are concentrated 
within the first few years of life, depending on the jurisdiction, rabies boosters are required every 
two or three years. /d. Individual jurisdictions set the frequency that rabies vaccinations must be 
administered. /d. Lawsuits alleging that particular statutes relating to the control of animals are 
beyond the police power of the jurisdiction have generally been unsuccessful. ORLAND SOAVE, 
ANIMALS, THE LAW AND VETERINARY MEDICINE, A GUIDE TO VETERINARY LAW 164 (4th ed. 
2000); see also Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 ( 1920) (hoi ding that a state statute 
requiring the licensing of a dog is not an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution). 
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2.7 for dogs and 2.3 for cats. 15 Veterinarians may be referred to as the 
"other family doctor'' or a "pet's family pediatrician." 16 The amount of 
money that people are willing to spend on medical care, for their animals 
varies widely; however, the total amount of money spent by pet owners 
in the United States on veterinary care is estimate.d at twelve billion 
dollars per year. 17 
More veterinarians now specialize in. areas of medicine such as 
dermatology, cardiology, dentistry, neurology, oncology, and 
ophthalmology .18 If one is willing and able to pay, veterinary medicine 
offers a wide range of preventive care as well as treatment for major 
15. AM. PET PROS. MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 5, at xx (reporting data from 2002). The average 
number of office visits to human physicians in the United States was three per person in 2000. 
NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 0FACE VISITS· TO PHYSICIANS, at 
http://www ~cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/docvisit.htm (last updated Oct. '14, 2003). The average number 
of visits to human physicians increases significantly with age. David L. Cherry & David H. 
Woodwell, National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 2000 Summary, in ADVANCE DATA 
FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS 4-5 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, No. 328, June 5, 2003), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/dataladlad328.pdf. (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
16. Animal Hosp~ of Elmont, Inc. v. Gianfrancisco, 418 N.Y.S.2d 992, 993 (Dist. Ct. 1979) 
(referring to veterinarians as a "pet;s family pediatrician"). One of the sessions at the 139th 
American Veterinary Medical Association Annual Convention held in July 2002 was titled "The 
Veterinarian: The Other Family Doctor." AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, 139TH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION PROGRAM 67 (2002) (on file with the author); see also FLA. VETERINARY MED. 
ASS'N, HOME PAGE, at http://www.fvma.com· (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (noting, in a tag line, 
"The Other Family Doctor ... Your Veterinarian."). 
17. Jerry Gleeson, Dog-gone Expensive, J. NEWS (Westchester Co., N.Y.), Dec. 26, 2001, at 
1 D (discussing the. total amount of money spent on veterinary care and the reasons for the 
increase in costs). Gleeson also reported on a survey by the American Animal Hospital 
Association that found that more that one third of the respondents said they "would spend any 
amount of money to save the lives of their pets ... eighteen percent ... . said they had spent more 
than $1,000 on veterinary care for their pets in the previous 12 months." /d. The amount of 
money spent on veterinary care has increased significantly in the last decade. Richard Willing, 
Under Law, Pets Are Becoming Almost Human,_ USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2000, at 1 A (citing to the 
American Veterinary Medical Association statistics that "Americans spent $11.1 billion on pet 
health care in 1998, up 61% from 1991 "), available at 2000 WL 5789496. The "demand for 
veterinary services has grown significantly faster than growth in the overall economy" for the· 
period from 1980 through 1997, and growth through the year 2015 is expected to be considerably 
higher than the anticipated growth in total consumer expenditures. John P. Brown & Jon D. 
Silvennan, The Current and Future Market for Veterinarians and Veterinary Medical Services in 
the United State.s: Executive Summary, May 1999, 215 1~ AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 161, 
164 (1999). The Executive Summary is derived from a comprehensive ·study of the veterinary 
profession that was commissioned by the American Veterinary Medical Association, the 
American Animal Hospital Association and the Association of American Veterinary Medical 
Colleges. ld. at 161. 
18. Peggy Noonan, New Tricks for Old Cats and Dogst Too, USA WEEKEND, May 11-13, 
2001, at 6 (discussing veterinary treatments and specialties}, available at http:/l 
www.usaweekend.com/Ol_issues/010513/010513pets.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); Ingrid 
Skjong, A Petts Guide to Vets, MINNEAPOLIS~ST. PAUL MAG., Sept. 1, 2002, at 62 (discussing 
veterinary specialties and specialists). 
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diseases. The type of medical care provided to animals is as 
sophisticated as the care available to humans and includes laser surgery, 
CAT scans, and MRis. 19 Companion animals receive kidney 
transplants, surgery to correct ruptured disks, and chemotherapy to treat 
cancer.20 An increasing number of animals receive daily 
pharmaceuticals and supplements to improve their quality of life, such 
as pain medication for arthritis.21 Increasingly, psychopharmaceuticals 
are prescribed to assist in the treatment of behavior problems.22 
Holistic treatments are available as an alternative to traditional 
veterinary medicine. 23 
Obviously the cost of these treatments can be significant. There are 
HMOs, discount networks, and other insurance plans to assist in paying 
for the costs of such care"24 Some companies now offer pet health 
19. Jane E. Brody, V.I.P. Medical Treatment Adds Meaning to a Dog's (or Cat's) Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at F4 (discussing treatments available to companion animals), available at 
LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Draper, supra note 13 (discussing laser surgery). 
20. Brody, supra note 19, at F4 (discussing treatments available to companion animals); see 
also Burkhard Bilger, The Lo.st Meow, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 8, 2003, at 46 (discussing kidney 
transplants and other issues relating to specialized veterinary treatment), available at 2003 WL 
10742365. 
21. Linda Bren, Prescriptions for Healthier Animals: Pet.s and People Frequently Fight 
Disease with Simi/at Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 1, 2000, at 24 (discussing the drugs used to 
treat both humans and animals for arthritis and other diseases), available at 2000 WL 91603600; 
Ranii, supra note 9 (discussing pain medication use for veterinary treatment generally and new 
medications that are now available). 
22. Debra Galant, Dr. Freud, I Think Fido Is Obsessive·Compulsive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
1999, at F6 (discussing the board certified specialty of animal behavior and the drugs used to treat 
behavioral disorders in dogs), available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Denise 
Grady, Human Drugs Apptovedfor Mental Problems in Dogs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at Al5 
(discussing the approval of human drugs for use in dogs), available. at LEXIS, News Library, 
New York Times File. 
23. Frank Bruni, Acupuncture for the Dog: Alternative Medicine Catches On with Pet 
Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18~ 1998, at Bl (discussing alternative treatments for animals, 
including acupuncture and hydrotherapy), available at LEXIS,. News Library, New York Times 
File; Kathleen Kiley, Healing Pets with a Holistic Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, § 14CN, 
at 7 (discussing holistic veterinary practice including the use of acupuncture), available at 
LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Sam Lubell, Alternative Medicine for Pets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, § 14WC, at 3 (discussing holistic veterinary practice), available at LEX IS, 
News Library, New York Times File. See generally ALTVETMED, COMPLEMENTARY & 
ALTERNATIVE VETERINARY MEDICINE, at http://www.altvetmed.com (last visited Feb. 20, 
2004); AM. ACAD. VETERINARY ACUPUNCWRE, HOME PAGE, at http://www.aava.org (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
24. Winter, supra note 14. Traditional health insurance policies have been available for 
twenty years; HMOs and discount networks recently have been established for veterinary 
treatment. /d.; see also Michelle Leder, How Much Is That $100 Deductible in the Window?, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2001, § 3, at 10 (discussing pet insurance policies), available at LEX IS, 
News Library1 New York Times File. A company called Veterinary Pet Insurance, which has 
more than 80% of the business, dominates the market for pet health insurance. Marketplace: Pet 
486 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal ' [Vol. 35 
insurance as an employee benefit.25 Although the number of animals 
covered by insurance in the United States is quite low, the pet health 
insurance business is growing.26 The cost of insurance varies 
depending on the type, age, and health of the animal.27 Because the 
vast majority of companion animals are not covered by insurance, the 
cost of their veterinary care must be covered by their human 
caretakers. 28 
Health Insurance (Minnesota Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.marketplace.org/features/doggie_in_the_window/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). 
25. Marketplace~· Pet Health Insurance, supra note 24 (referring to Metlife, Sprint, and Miller 
Brewing as examples of companies that include pet health insurance in their employee, benefit 
plans). Other companies that offer pet insurance as an employee benefit include AT&T and 
Computer Associates. Yilu Zhao, Break a Leg, Fluffy~ If You Have Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 2002, § 9, at 11, available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File. 
26. Estimates of the number of pet owners who have health insurance for their animals range 
from one to three percent. Marketplace: Pet Health Insurance, supra note 24. Note that, in 
Europe, approximately thirty percent of pets are covered by insurance. Jd.; Leder, supra note 24; 
Patricia Poist-Reilly, Pet Insurance, LANCASTER NEW ERA (Lancaster~ Pa.), Sept. 17, 2001 ,. at 1 
(stating that the number of insured pets increased from one percent in 1997 to three percent in 
2000). 
27. Block, supra note 8. According to the CEO of Veteri.nary Pet Insurance, the "average dog 
owner pays $250 a year in premiums .. ~ cat owners pay an average of$200 per year." /d. 
28. As further evidence of the importance of these animals, as well as the costs that some will 
incur on their behalf, consider how some people handle the death of their companion animals. 
The ba'ckyard burial is no longer the only option; pet cemeteries provide a final resting place for 
many pets. La Monica Everett-Haynes, Rest in Peace: Sending Spot to His Reward; Casket 
Company Tries To Ease Pain of Parting with Pets, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug,. 4, 2000, at B1, 
available atLEXIS, News & Business Library, All News File; Andrea Jones, Pet Cemetery an 
Idyll to Unconditional Love, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 25, 2001, at 16D, available at 2001 
WL 3705701; John Murawski, A Quiet Resting Place for Lost Loved Ones, PALM BEACH POST, 
Feb. 26, 2001, at 1 A, available at 200 I WL 14130406; Pat Shellenbarger, Burial Services Help 
Survivors Mourn Loss of Pets, SOUTH BEND TRIB., May 21, 2001, at C5 (quoting Brenda Drown, 
the executive secretary of the International AssociatiQn of Pet Cemeteries, that there are 750 to 
800 pet cemeteries in the United States), available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, All 
News File; Dawn Wotapka, Owners Increasingly Opt To Cremate Deceased Pets, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 14, 2001, at Nl, available at 2001 WL 3482461 (discussing an 
increase in animal cremation and a ban on backyard burials). It is still possible to dispose of an 
animal's body by sending it to a local landfill in some municipalities. Wotapka, supra. There are 
a few cemeteries that allow for the burial of both humans and animals. Linda Wilson-Fuoco, 
Cemetery Offers Resting Place for Pets and Their People, PIITSBURGH POST-GAZETIE, Feb. 20, 
2000, at W 4 (discussing a pet cemetery located within the bounds of an existing cemetery in 
Pennsylvania), available at 2001 WL 10882850; see also Grave Animal Reunion, MX 
(Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 18, 200.J, at 9 (discussing joint human-animal cemetery in Great 
Britain), available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, AU N·ews File. If a person cannot bear 
to be separated from his or her pet, it is possible to mummify small dogs and cats. SUMMUM, 
MODERN MUMMIFICATION, at http://www .summum.org/mummificationlpets/animalcosts.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (providing for mummification of small dogs and cats at prices ranging 
from $6000 to $14,000). There are also organizations that bank the genes of animals in 
anticipation of the development of technology that will allow them to clone these family 
members. Roy Bragg, Businessman Sees Dollars in Replication, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Sept. 4, 2002, at I A (discussing the market for pet-related ventures including pet cloning and 
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Given the changing nature of the relationship of humans to 
companion animals and the practice of veterinary medicine, it is time to 
consider the way that the legal system assesses damages in veterinary 
malpractice cases. This Article begins with a description of 
veterinarians and the status of veterinary malpractice.29 I will compare 
veterinarians and human physicians and the malpractice situation for 
both.30 Next, this Article considers the elements and the key issues 
involved in veterinary malpractice.31 This Article then analyzes the 
current law relating to the damages available in veterinary malpractice 
suits.32 Finally, this Article considers whether the way that these 
damages are calculated is appropriate and suggests an alternative to the 
current system. 33 The focus of this Article will be on the treatment of 
companion animals, as the calculation of damages for malpractice 
some criticisms of pet cloning), available at 2002 WL 23795892; Roy Bragg, Replicating Rover, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 3, 2002, at lA (discussing Genetic Savings and Clone, a 
company that is banking tissue samples for pets in anticipation of the successful commercial 
cloning of animals), available at 2002 WL 23795796; Diane Jennings, Sponsors of Dog-cloning 
Project Look Beyond A&M for Results, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. II , 2002, at A47 (citing 
to the chief executive officer of Genetic Savings and Clone, Lou Hawthorne, who stated that in 
three years the company "hopes to be able to clone dogs consistently for less than $20,000 each"). 
The A&M cloning project and Genetic Savings and Clone were financed by a 3.7 million dollar 
grant from John Sperling and Joan Hawthorne who wished to clone their dog. Helen Rumbelow, 
Dog's Owners Are Throwing Late "Missy" a Clone, WASH. POST, July 27, 2002, at A3 
(discussing the grant and the work at Texas A&M, which successfully cloned a cat in December 
200 I), available at 2002 WL 24823794; see also 48 Hours: Pet Project: Debating the Idea of 
Cloning Domestic Pets (CBS News television broadcast, Mar. 29, 2002) (discussing the cloning 
of a domesticated cat-Copy Cat and other issues relating to the cloning of domesticated 
animals), transcript available at 2002 WL 8873800. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Legal 
Perspectives on Cloning: Cloning Endangered Animal Species, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 383 (1998) 
(discussing issues relating to the cloning of endangered animal species); Stacy J. Ratner, Note, 
Baa, Baa, Cloned Sheep, Have You Any Law? Legislative Responses to Animal Cloning in the 
European Union and United States, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 141 (1999) (discussing the 
legislation in the United States and the European Union related to animal cloning and proposing 
that an ethical content be added to U.S. law). 
29. See infra Part II.A-B (providing an overview of the veterinary profession and the scope of 
veterinary malpractice claims). The following terms are used in this Article: "animal" or 
"animals" refer to non-human animal(s); "client" refers to the person who has engaged a 
veterinarian to care for his or her animal; and "patient" refers to the animal under a veterinarian's 
care. 
30. See infra Part II.A. (comparing veterinarians and physicians); infra Pan II.B.4 (comparing 
issues in veterinary malpractice and medical malpractice). 
31. See infra Part III (discussing elements of veterinary malpractice). 
32. See infra Part IV (discussing available economic and non-economic damages in veterinary 
malpractice claims). 
33. See infra Pan V (analyzing the arguments for and against non-economic damages and 
proposing the adoption of veterinary malpractice acts). 
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involving animals for food production has been relatively 
uncontroversial to date.34 
II. VETERINARIANS AND THE STATUS OF VETERINARY 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
A. Veterinarians 
The practice of veterinary medicine is similar in many ways to the 
practice of human medicine, with some obvious significant differences. 
As with other professionals, the practice of veterinary medicine is 
governed primarily by state law. 35 Veterinarians are required to have a 
minimum of six years of training, with two years of study in a pre-
veterinary program and four years in a college of veterinary medicine. 36 
Individuals in most states may apply for licensure after obtaining a 
Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (D.V.M.) degree and passing a national 
board examination.37 
As discussed above, the medical care provided to some companion 
animals is comparable to the best that human medicine has to offer.38 
Similar to human medicine, veterinary medicine has developed 
specialized practice areas. 39 Because of their status as licensed 
professionals, veterinarians, like physicians, receive protection under 
Good Samaritan laws in some states if they provide emergency medical 
care.40 
34. Equines fall within the category of companion animals, in so much as they are generally 
treated on an individual basis rather than as part of a group, at least in connection with damage 
awards. Unlike dogs, cats, certain birds, and other animals kept in or near a house, equines 
historically have possessed independent economic value. Many early animal welfare statutes 
limited their scope to animals that were deemed commercially valuable, such as horses, cattle, 
sheep, and swine. DAVID FAVRE & PETER L. BORCHELT, ANIMAL LAW AND DOG BEHAVIOR 
254-55 ( 1999). Note, however, that according to one source, the United States slaughters 
approximately 100,000 horses per year, and worldwide approximately 75o/o of all racehorses end 
their lives at slaughterhouses. GARY L. F'RANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMALS RIGHTS: 
YOUR CHILD OR THE DoG? 26 (2000). Presumably, at that point in time, the horse is valued 
similarly to food producing animals. 
35. WILSON, supra note 14, at 50--51. 
36. David M. Smith, Pay and Productivity Differences Between Male and Female 
Veterinarians, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 495 (2002). 
37. /d.; see also SOAVE, supra note 14, at 56-67 (discussing veterinary practice acts and the 
general practice of veterinary medicine). 
38. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the medical procedures 
available to animals). 
39. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing specialization in veterinary 
medicine). 
40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (2002) (stating that a veterinarian providing 
emergency care to an injured or sick animal will not be liable for civil damages as a result of the 
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Another similarity to physicians is that veterinarians in some states 
must keep information about their patients confidential.41 This 
privilege has not arisen out of the common law but instead has been 
adopted by statute.42 Without statutory authorization, courts have been 
unwilling to create the privilege between veterinarians and clients, 
perhaps because there is no widespread recognition of privacy concerns 
in connection with the care of animals.43 Statements of privilege 
generally provide that a veterinarian will n_ot disclose any information 
concerning the care of an animal without written authorization or other 
waiver by the client.44 The st'!ltutes also set out exceptions to the 
privilege, including the required reporting of communicable diseases. 
care, but not precluding liability for civil damages as a result of gross negligence or reckless or 
intentional misconduct); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.18826 (West 2001) (providing 
protection from liability for civil damages in situations where animals have been brought to a 
veterinarian by someone other than their owners but stating that the section would not apply if 
acts amount to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct); OR. REv. STAT. § 686.440 
' ' (2001) (providing immunity from civil liability for emergency treatment of animals under certain 
circumstances and stating that the section does not apply to acts that constitute gross negligence); 
see also Mark Turner, Dial9 I I: Emergency Medical Care Providers, Gross Negligence, and the 
Loophole in the Connecticut Good Samaritan Statute, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 419 (2000) 
(discussing Good Samaritan statutes covering physicians generally and the Connecticut statute in 
particular); Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a 
Victim Lying in the Street? What Is Left of the American Rule, and WUl It Survive Unabated?, 26 
PEPP. L. REv. 353; 364-66 (1999) (discussing the adoption in all fifty states ofGood Samaritan 
laws to deal with the provision of emergency medical services to humans). 
41. Note that statutes relating to confidentiality "contain an exception to their application 
when a communicable and reportable livestock disease is involved." Harold W. Hannah, When 
Can Failure To Inform Support a Malpractice Claim, 218 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 
14l9, 1420 (2001). 
42., COLO. REV. STAT.§ 12-64-120(3) (2003) (providing that records concerning an animal's 
care are available to the public unless a veterinary-patient-client privilege exists); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 474.2165 (West 2001) (providing for the ownership and control of veterinary medical 
patient records and requiring confidentiality of records with exceptions allowing disclosure); 
TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 801.353 (Vernon 2003) (setting forth veterinary-client privilege and 
providing exceptions allowing veterinarians to release infonnation concerning a veterinarian's 
care of an animal); see also Harold W. Hannah, Communications, Privilege, and the 
Veterinarian, 2l9 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass;N, 32, .32 (2001) (discussing confidentiality and 
privilege in veterinary medicine). 
43. Tucker v. Steel~ & Assocs., No. 93-C 12.68, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4600, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 8, 1994) (rejecting the application of a common law veterinarian-client privilege and stating 
that "the reasons for seeking veterinary care and the medical condition of an animal are of an 
entirely different nature from the personal privacy of one)s own health"). But see GA. CODE 
ANN. § 50-I R-72(a)(2) (Harrison 1998) (providing that public disclosure is not required for 
medical or veterinary records "the disclosure of which would be an invasion of personal 
privacy"). Note that Illinois now has a statutory provision governing the disclosure of 
information contained in veterinary records. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/25.10 (2002). 
44. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4857 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. ·§ 474.2165(5); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 24-4-29 (Harrison 1998); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/25.17 (2002); KAN . STAT. 
ANN. 47-839 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 340.286 (West 2001); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.§ 801.353; 
see also Hannah, supra note 42, at 32. 
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Other exceptions to the rule provide for disclosure if the information is 
subpoenaed, an issue in litigation, or the subject of an administrative 
disciplinary action.45 From a practical perspective, problems arising out 
of the disclosure of confidential information in veterinary medicine, 
while perhaps not good practice for purposes of client retention, are 
limited.46 
Despite the similarities, there are several aspects of a veterinarian's 
practice that are distinctly different from the practice of medical 
doctors. For example, veterinarians customarily dispense drugs through 
their practice.47 Medication and supply sales are part of the gross 
profits that a veterinary practice generates.48 One veterinarian 
estimated that fifteen to twenty percent of his practice's gross profits 
were due to the sale of drugs and treatments.49 There is no prohibition 
on pharmaceutical companies selling drugs for animals to phartnacies, 
but some of the larger manufacturers have policies that restrict their 
sales to licensed veterinarians.50 The American Veterinary Medical 
Association ("AVMA") has expressed concern that some pharmacy 
practices will undermine the veterinary client-patient relationship.51 
The A VMA has a position statement that "encourages veterinarians to 
honor client requests to prescribe rather than dispense a drug";52 yet one 
veterinarian has stated that he will give prescriptions upon a client's 
request but Hover the long run he will advise them to think about 
seeking pet treatme_nt elsewhere."53 Veterinarians indicate that if they 
no longer are able to profit from sales of medications, it may be 
45. Hannah, supra note 42, at 32. 
46. WILSON, supra note 14, at 345. But see Tucker, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4600, at *8-* 10 
(discussing the physician-patient privilege in the context of a veterinary malpractice case). 
"[T]he purpose behind the physician-patient privilege simply does not apply in the context of the 
veterinarian-client relationship because the reasons for seeking veterinary care and the medical 
condition of an animal are of an entirely different nature from the personal privacy of one's own 
health." /d. 
47. Ross Snel, Veterinarians Snarl over Online Drug Sales: Savings to Consumers Take Bite 
Out of Doctors' Profits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at B9G, available at 2002 WL--WSJ 
3385776. Oregon statutory law illustrates an exception to the general rule that physicians 
customarily do not dispense prescriptions. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.089 (2001) (setting forth the 
requirements for physicians dispensing prescription drugs). 
48. Snel, supra note 47; see also Ve-terinary Care Without the Bite, CONSUMER REP., July 
2003, at 12, 14 (''Drug sales are a leading profit center for veterinarians, constituting 18 percent 
of revenue. Markups on medicines range from 100 to 250 percent."). 
49. Snel, supra note 47. 
50. ld. 
51. Rebecca Osvath, FDA, Vet Group Concerned About Illegal Compounding of Animal 
Drugs, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, May 6., 2002., at 24, available at 2002 WL 11879224. 
52. ld. 
53. Snel, supra note 47. 
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necessary to increase the rates for their other services.54 Veterinarians 
are held to the same standards as other dispensers of controlled 
substances.55 There are only approximately a dozen pharmacies that 
specialize in medications for pets in the United States,56 but a growing 
number of online animal pharn1acies are entering the market. 57 
Certainly the compensation for the average veterinarian is far less 
than for a medical doctor. Nationwide, the average salary for 
veterinarians is $60,91058 compared with dentist and doctor mean 
incomes (in 1999) of $125,358 and $163,000, respectively.59 
Another distinction is that, pursuant to some state laws, veterinarians 
may have a lien on the animals under their care.60 In this way 
veterinarians are treated like any other caretakers of animals, or in fact, 
like automobile mechanics.61 In some states, a veterinarian who is not 
paid for an animal's care may sell the animal to satisfy the debt.62 
Just as there are some similarities between the practice of veterinary 
medicine and human medicine, parallels can be drawn between the 
status of malpractice claims in these two professions. 
54. /d. 
55. Chris Duke, Vets Must Adhere to DEA Regulations, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Mar. 11, 
2002, at B3, available at 2002 WL 11386954. 
56. Anna McCart, Pharmacist Prepares Rx for Pet Medicine, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 13, 
2002, at 30, available at 2002 WL 4065240. 
57. Snel, supra note 47. 
58. Lisa Heyamoto, Vets Love the Work and the Pets, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 21, 
2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 22441355. 
59. Steve Dale, Clients, Vets Speak Out on Billing Practices, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 
21, 2002, at E3. "Top" veterinarians can make nearly $130,000. Heyamoto, supra note 58. The 
actual number of licensed veterinarians in the United States is approximately 65,000, with an 
additional 22,000 new veterinarians estimated by 2010. /d. 
60. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3051 (West 1993) (providing for liens on animals under the 
care of veterinary proprietors and surgeons (as well as liens benefiting drycleaners and plastic 
fabricators)); see also SOAVE, supra note 14, at 49. The lien depends on possession of the 
animal. /d. 
61. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 49-51. The Iowa provision cited to by Soave specifically cites 
to "(l]ivery and feed stable keepers, herders, feeders, [or] keepers of stock." IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 579.1 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003). The same Iowa code section is used to recover the expenses 
of storing motor vehicles and boats. /d. Soave states that "the right to sell or otherwise dispose 
of an animal in the holder's possession is not legal in many states." SOAVE, supra note 14, at 50. 
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3052 (West 1993) (allowing for the public sale by veterinarians of 
animals under their care following notice that such sale will occur if amounts due are not paid); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 579.2 (West 1992) (providing for lienholders to sell the specified stock and 
property at public auction); see also Jakubaitis v. Fischer, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(analyzing the applicability of sections 3051 and 3052 of the California Civil Code to 
veterinarians). 
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B. The Status of Veterinary Malpractice Claims 
1. Trends in Veterinary Malpractice Claims 
It is difficult to obtain statistics on the number of cases brought 
against veterinarians for malpractice. One source states that there are 
more than two thousand cases of malpractice and negligence filed in 
U.S. courts each year.63 This, of course, does not reflect the actual 
number of claims filed with veterinary malpractice insurance carriers. 
There are statistics indicating that the frequency and dollar amount of 
claims for veterinary malpractice increased significantly in the ten-year 
period prior to 1993.64 The frequency of claims increased from one 
claim for every twenty-five insured veterinarians to one claim for every 
sixteen insured veterinarians during that period of time, but then 
remained consistent for a period of years.65 It is clear that the number 
of claims, at least in some jurisdictions, is increasing.66 
There are concerns that the average dollar amount of veterinary 
malpractice claims is increasing as well. In the mid-1990s, lawsuits 
often settled for between $5000 and $10,000.67 A 1995 case in 
California over the death of a cat when a veterinarian treated the eat's 
fleas with a toxic product settled for $15,000.68 A Kentucky jury 
awarded a client $15,000 after a veterinarian negligently spayed a 
German shepherd causing the animal's death.69 Botched dental repairs 
63. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 21. The damages claimed for many of these cases are likely 
relatively low dollar amounts. For example, the State of California requires every professional 
liability insurer to report any settlement of more than $3000 to the California Veterinary Medical 
Board ("CVMB"). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 801 (West 2003). The CVMB records indicate 
that over the last four years the board has received eight reports of settlements over $3000. E-
mail from Gina Bayless, Enforcement Program Manager, California Veterinary Medical Board, to 
author (Nov. I, 2002) (copy on file with author). 
64. Jack R. Dinsmore, Veterinary Lawsuits: Trends and Defense Strategies, 23 VETERINARY 
CLINICS N.AM. 1019, 1019 (1993) (citing infonnation from the American Veterinary Medical 
Association ("A VMA") Professional Liability Insurance Trust (the "PLIT")). 
65. /d. 
66. Telephone Interview with Jay P. O'Brien, CIC, Executive Vice-president, ABD Insurance 
and Financial Services (Oct. 28, 2002) (stating that his company has seen an increasing number 
of malpractice claims against veterinarians in California in recent years); see also Willing, supra 
note 17 (stating that "lawsuits against veterinarians are increasing"). 
67. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 233. 
68. /d. (citing to the Rappaport v. McElroy settlement ~ith insurance company). Note that the 
plaintiff in Rappaport alleged a variety of claims against the veterinarian including trespass to 
chattel, conversion, and spoliation of evidence. Complaint of Plaintiff, Rappaport v. McElroy, 
No. 95E09139 (L.A. Mun. Ct. (Van Nuys Branch) filed Sept. 25, 1995) (copy on file with 
author). One of the allegations in the Rappaport case was that the veterinarian lost the deceased 
eat' s body when the plaintiff specifically requested that the body be preserved. /d. 
69. Stephanski v. Wimpy, No. 96CI 00118, DEC 261.60 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Apr. 14, 1997) (copy on 
file with author). 
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on a Rottweiler led to a $27,000 award against another California 
veterinarian in 2000.70 One study found that in the late 1990s, jury 
awards for the tortious loss of animals generally ranged from $5000 to 
$35,000 in a six-state survey.71 What clearly has changed is the 
growing attention to the issue in the general press with cases with large 
damage awards receiving significant coverage.72 
2. Reasons for Increases in Veterinary Malpractice Claims 
There are several factors often cited for the increase in frequency and 
dollar amount of claims. 73 In discussions regarding the increase in 
veterinary malpractice, as well as other professional malpractice claims, 
one category of factors often referenced is the changes in the litigation 
system that support these types of claims.74 Jack Dinsmore believes 
that there is an increased willingness to litigate claims.75 The legal and 
mainstream press report cases with large damage awards, leading to the 
perception that these types of awards are commonplace.76 This 
70. Evers v. Palmer, No. 773909 (Cal. Super~ Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (copy on file with author). In 
addition to the veterinary malpractice claims, Evers' complaint included claims of conversion and 
breach of a California statutory provision. According to the attorney for Evers, owing to 
limitations on non-economic damages in veterinary malpractice cases, attorneys in California 
have developed alternative theories for recovery. Telephone Interview with Michael Rosten, 
Attorney (Jan. 16, 2003); see also Willing, supra note 17 (stating that jury verdicts for harm done 
to pets outside the veterinary malpractice area also appear to be increasing, with awards running 
as high as $35,000). 
. . . 
71. Willing, supra note 17 (citing to a Jury Verdict Research study finding jury awards of 
$5000 to $35,000 in the previous four years in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and Utah). 
72. Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veterinarians in the Doghouse~· Are Pet Suits 
Economically Viable?, 31 THE BRIEF 43, 43 (2002) (discussing media reports of damage awards). 
Notwithstanding the coverage of cases where there have been significant monetary awards, it 
appears that the average award in cases dealing with companion animals remains relatively low. 
See E-mail from Gina Bayless, supra note 63 (noting only eight settlements of more than $3000 
were reported to the California Veterinary Medical Board). 
73. See Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 102Q-23 (discussing trends in lawsuits against 
veterinarians). 
7 4. /d. at 1020-21. 
75. /d. at 1020; cf. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the 
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 717, 746-47 (1998) (stating that one impact of the 
American public's perception that there is a litigation explosion has been "to increase the calls 
that lawyers receive" and that "(t]he effect of this rhetoric is to make people think that if anything 
goes wrong they can get significant compensation"). But see Roselyn Bonanti, Tort "Refonn" in 
the States, TRIAL, Aug. 2000, at 28 (stating that one study found that "tort filings have decreased 
16 percent since 1996''). 
76. Galanter, supra note 75, at 744 47 (discussing the "jaundiced viewH of the civil liability 
system in the United States and media distortion of tort issues, including the fact that one study 
reported "virtually all" television coverage of trials was triggered if a verdict had an "unusually 
large'' punitive damage award). 
494 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 35 
regularity in image damages results in an increased awareness of the 
possibility of claims against veterinarians by plaintiff's attorneys.77 
Presumably, these plaintiffs attorneys will then be more likely to 
represent clients with similar lawsuits, increasing the total number of 
claims.78 
A second category of factors relates to the changing nature of the 
veterinary client.79 Clients now have higher expectations of veterinary 
treatments and procedures than they did in previous decades. 80 
Certainly there are clients who are willing to spend a significant amount 
of money on sophisticated procedures in order to save a companion 
animal's life.81 There is growing recognition of a significant bond 
between some people and their companion animals.82 When these 
companion animals die, their owners can experience grief in a manner 
similar to when a human family member dies. 83 This is important since 
many claims brought against veterinarians relate to the death of an 
animal. 84 Particularly in connection with equines with a significant 
economic value, there can be corporate or syndicate investors that are 
accustomed to utilizing the legal system to "replace a financialloss."85 
Regardless of the type of animal at issue, unhappy clients are more 
77. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1020. Jay O'Brien also cites to increased publicity as a factor 
supporting the increase in the number of claims. O'Brien, supra note 66. 
78. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1020. Dinsmore also cites to the contingent fee arrangement, 
which allows clients the possibility of collecting money for claims without paying the costs of an 
attorney's time. /d. 
79. /d. 
80. /d.; cf 1 ROLAND E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 21 (5th ed. 
2000) (discussing reasons for the increase in legal malpractice claims, including "higher client 
expectations"); David J. Sokol, The Current Status of Medical Malpractice Countersuits, 10 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 439, 442 (1985) (citing the unrealistic expectations of patients arising from the 
improvements in ·medical technology as a major factor in the medical malpractice crisis); 
O'Brien, supra note 66 (discussing the focus of veterinarians on preventive care). 
81. See O'Brien, supra note 66 (discussing the changing nature of veterinary medicine and the 
increased investment by clients using sophisticated technology); see also Brody, supra note 19 
(discussing medical treatments available to companion animals including CAT scans and 
M.R.I.s); Draper, supra note 13 (discussing laser surgery). 
82. Huss, Companion Anima/Issues, supra note 7 at 182 & n.6 (discussing the theory that the 
way humans speak to companion animals indicates a significant bond). 
83. See Sonia S. W aisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of ''Non-economic" Damages for 
the Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 
ANIMAL L. 45., 58-59 (2001) (citing to pet headstones and growing counseling services as 
evidence of grief); see also Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional 
Distress, Loss of Society and Loss of Cotnpanionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion 
Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 48 (1998) (discussing grief over the loss of an animal). 
84. WILSON, supra note 14; at 119-20 (discussing the number of claims associated with the 
death of an animal and ways that veterinarians can avoid complaints relating to such deaths). 
85. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1021. 
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likely than satisfied customers to try to avoid paying a veterinarian's 
bill. Just as with other types of professional malpractice, a lawsuit by a 
veterinarian to collect on an unpaid bill often results in a counterclaim 
against the veterinarian for malpractice.86 
The final category of factors leading to an increase in the number of 
claims and in the amount of damages relates to the economic value of 
the animals themselves.87 Just as with other forms of personal property, 
market pressures and inflation have caused the economic value of at 
least certain animals to increase.88 Food producing animals, such as 
cattle, sheep, and chickens, and working equines have always had 
measurable economic value.89 In contrast, dogs (and presumably, by 
analogy, cats) were considered to have no intrinsic value.90 As 
discussed below, there have been inroads into the traditional ways that 
animals, particularly companion animals, have been valued.91 With the 
awarding of higher damages, veterinary malpractice suits become more 
feasible from an economic perspective for both clients and attorneys.92 
86. /d.; l MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 7 (discussing claims filed in response to 
lawsuits by lawyers for unpaid fees as a major area of legal malpractice actions); see~ e.g., 
Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114, 114-15 (Colo. 2001) (setting aside a damage award based 
on professional negligence (as it found that the client did not present expert evidence establishing 
that the veterinarian failed to meet the standard of care for veterinarians) in a case where a 
veterinarian sued for $2861 in unpaid fees and the defendant's response included a counterclaim 
for $5000 for negligent petfonnance of services); Bedford v. Jorden, 698 P.2d 854, 854-56 
(Mont. 1985) (affinning summary judgment in favor of veterinarian-defendant for a malpractice 
case alleging $50,000 in punitive damages after a parrot died following the filing of a claim with 
a credit bureau against the client for an unpaid bill); Lakeshore Animal Hosp. v. Sutton, No. 13-
083, 1989 WL 78582 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (upholding a trial court's judgment that allowed a 
client to counterclaim for professional malpractice after a veterinarian sued her for unpaid 
services). Mallen and Smith state that "insurers have reported that malpractice claims filed in 
response to fee actions comprise approximately 20 percent of all claims against attorneys." I 
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 7. Mallen and Smith continue by discussing the fact that 
these counterclaims act to deter lawyers from suing for unpaid fees. /d. at 8. 
87. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1020. 
88. /d. 
89. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 255 (discussing early welfare statutes that limited 
their coverage to animals that were deemed to be commercially valuable). 
90. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 700--01 ( 1897) (finding that a 
dog that allegedly was negligently killed by a railroad company had no intrinsic value, unlike 
other animals that can be used as beasts of burden or for food). 
91. See infra Part IV (discussing animal valuation issues). 
92. See Paul Marcotte, More than a Pet Project, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 26 (discussing 
lawyers who specialize in animal rights and typical damage awards); Mark S. Lindensmith, 
Veterinary Malpractice: How Much Was That Doggy in the Window, TRIAL, Jan. 1982, at 49-51 
(discussing veterinary malpractice and damages). 
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3. Veterinary Malpractice Insurance 
The largest provider of professional liability insurance for 
veterinarians in the United States is the A VMA' s Professional Liability 
Insurance Trust (the "PLIT'').93 The PLIT insures more than 70% of the 
eligible members of the AVMA.94 The PLIT considers the number of 
claims, costs of defense, costs of settlement, and other statistics about 
its relationship with its insured veterinarians to be proprietary 
information.95 Some information is available that may be used to 
reflect the impact of malpractice claims on veterinarians. The PLIT 
divides veterinarians into four categories: Small Animal, Mixed Practice 
(Predominately Small), Large Animal, and Equine.96 The lowest rates 
are available for veterinarians in small animal practices and the highest 
for equine practices.97 Primary insurance coverage (per 
claim/aggregate) ranges from $100,000/$300,000 to 
$1,000,000/$3,000,000.98 Excess professional liability insurance is 
available up to $5,000,000 (per claim and aggregate).99 It is also 
possible to purchase a professional extension endorsement that covers 
claims due to the injury or death of animals under a veterinarian's 
custody and control unrelated to treatment.100 The rates are the same 
93. Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard E. Shirbroun, Trust Representative, American 
Veterinary Medical Association Professional Liability Insurance Trust (Sept. 4, 2002) [hereinafter 
Shirbroun Interview]. 
94. ld. The AVMA created the PLIT in 1962 to provide a source of professional liability 
coverage for veterinarians. ld. 
95. /d. A few articles relating to professional liability issues were published by the Journal of 
the American Veterinary Medical Association through the 1980s. Joseph H. King, Jr., The 
Standard of Care for Veterinarians in Medical Malpractice Claims, 58 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 
(1990); Gregg A. Scoggins, Legislation Without Representation: How Veterinary Medicine Has 
Slipped Through the Cracks ofTort Refoml, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 953,955 n.l7. 
96. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N; PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE TRUST (2001) 
[hereinafter AVMAPLIT] (listing annual premiums effective January 1, 2001), available at 
http://www .avmaplit.cornlindex.cfm ?cont=nonmember/data!Professional.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 
2003). Similarly, legal studies on legal malpractice claims (and the applicable rates) divide 
practitioners into several practice areas, including corporate and business organizations, real 
estate, personal injury, criminal law, and family law. l MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 30-
31 (citing to studies of malpractice claims by area of law); Mark Hansen, Pricey Premiums: 
Malpractice Insurance Casts May Continue To Rise Before They Fall, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 
26 (stating that the increase in legal malpractice insurance rates depends in part on the area of 
practice). 
97. AVMAPLIT, supra note 96 (listing annual premiums effective January 1, 2001). From 
even a layperson's standpoint, the higher rates for equine practice make sense given the large 
damage awards that historically have been awarded in successful malpractice cases relating to 
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regardless of the geographic location of a veterinarian's practice. 101 
The PLIT has not changed its rates since 1994. 102 
4. Comparison to Medical Malpractice 
The relatively stable situation for veterinarians is in sharp contrast to 
the professional liability insurance and malpractice situation for 
physicians. 103 Medical malpractice claims increased substantially in the 
101. Shirbroun Interview, supra note 93. This is in contrast to medical and legal malpractice 
insurance rates, which are dependent in part on the location of the professional. Hansen, supra 
note 96, at 26 (discussing increasing malpractice rates and citing experts that state that such rates 
are up by IOOo/o or more "depending on such criteria as location, claims history, policy limits and 
area of practice;,). 
102. Shirbroun Interview, supra note 93. The rates actually decreased from 1992 to 1994 and 
have remained unchanged since that time. /d. The rates are set pursuant to actuarial tables that 
take into account, in part, the number of claims and e·xtent of damages. /d. 
103. Medical malpractice claims include suits against healthcare professionals other than 
physicians, but just as with physicians, the trend appears to be an increase in cases and awards in 
other areas of medical practice. E.g., Sokol, supra note 80, at 442 n.IS (discussing the dental 
malpractice crisis). The malpractice situation for other professionals also has been considered in 
crisis. For example, there was approximately a 155% increase in legal malpractice decisions in 
the 1990s. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 21 (citing to studies on the number of 
published appellate decisions concerning legal malpractice). There is a significant increase in the 
number of lawyers in the population (with new admissions at 30,000 to 32,000 per year); the 
relative rate of increase of decisions is greater than this increase in lawyer population. /d. 
(analyzing statistics on malpractice decisions and growth in the lawyer population). Mallen and 
Smith report that "the rate of increase is declining, though the absolute number of claims is not." 
/d. As with veterinary malpractice insurers, legal malpractice insurers generally do not disclose 
data on the number and cost of claims. /d. at 21-22 (discussing avaihtble statistics on legal 
malpractice claims). Notwithstanding the limited inforrnation available, statistics "confinn the 
trend of reported decisions that claims frequency is not increasing significantly but severity (size 
of loss) is increasing." /d. at 22. As with medical malpractice rates, legal '~malpractice insurance 
rates have been on the increase in recent years." WARREN FREEDMAN, A GUIDE TO 
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR LEGAL AND LAW-RELATED PROFESSIONS 12-13 (1995) (citing to 
a rate increase of 20% by the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society). Some of the recent 
increases have been attributed to the changing legal climate after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001; however, market forces are considered to be the driving force in the 
increasing rates. Hansen, supra note 96. "Legal malpractice insurance rates are up across the 
board for the first time in years .... " ld. For example, one carrier that covers lawyers practicing 
in large fim1s "raised its rates by 35 percent to 40 percent at the start of the year." /d. Another 
company that insures solo practitioners and small finn lawyers "is raising rates 5 percent to 30 
percent." /d. The market for insurance for attorneys is reportedly tightening with experts 
predicting that rates will likely increase before any leveling or decrease. /d. Insurers also are 
reallocating risk in other ways, such as adding exclusions and lowering policy limits. !d. 
Although there are concerns about rising legal malpractice rates, the situation is better than in 
previous decades, particularly "the mid-1980s, when many lawyers couldn't find insurance or 
couldn't afford the coverage that was available." ld~ (citing to experts in insurance). In order to 
assist attorneys in obtaining coverage, some state bars have created their own insurance 
companies. Mark Hansen, Under Covered: Proponents Say Fewer Lawyers Will Go Bare If 
Forced To Disclose Their Insurance Status, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 46 (stating that there were 
sixteen bar-related insurance companies that offer malpractice insurance in thirty states) 
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mid-1970s and rnid-1980s.104 In response to the increasing number of 
malpractice suits and damage awards, insurance companies increased 
their rates significantly .105 In the 1990s, the severity of claims steadily 
increased; however, the increase did not result in a malpractice "crisis," 
as in the previous two decades.106 Initially, in response to- the 
increasing costs of insurance, physicians cancelled high risk procedures, 
formed their own insurance carriers, and lobbied extensively for 
refortns in the liability laws to prevent excessive damage awards. 107 
Within the- last few years there have been concerns that another 
malpractice crisis could lead to a reduction in patients' access to care. 108 
Insurance rates and the number of claims per physician vary 
substantially from state to state.109 
The American Medical Association h~s identified the primary cause 
of the "emerging crisis" as the "escalation in jury awards in medical 
104. Patricia J. Chupkovich, Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribution to the Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining Affordable- Health 
Care?, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 337, 337 (1993). In the 1960s, the frequency of tort 
claims per one hundred physicians was one claim per one hundred doctors. PAUL C. WEILER, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 2 (1991). In the mid-1980s, the number of claims was 
seventeen claims per one hundred doctors. Jd~ By the end of the 1980s the number of claims was 
approximately thirteen claims per one hundred doctors. Jd~; see also Jason Leo, Note, Torts-
Medical Malpractice: The Legislature's Attempt To Prevent Cases Without Merit Denies Valid 
Claims, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1399, 1402-06 (2000) (examining the history of medical 
malpractice claims and statutes). 
105. Chupkovich, supra note 104, at 337. 
I 06. See David M. Studdert, Toward a Workable Model of "No·fault" Compensation for 
Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 225 (2001) (discussing the cyclical 
nature of medical malpractice and issues with insurance coverage); see also Bonanti, supra note 
75 (stating that one study found that ''tort filings have decreased 16 percent since 1996" and 
another study found "only 2 percent of persons injured by negligent medical care filed suit"). 
107. Chupkovich, supra note 104, at 337-38. But see Bonanti, supra note 75 (citing studies 
that show that "excessive verdicts in civil cases are rare" and "only 7 ~2 percent of civil litigants 
received damages of $1 million or more, and million-dollar verdicts continue to be awarded only 
in cases involving the most severe injuries"). 
108. John A. MacDonald, Bush: Cap Awards in Malpractice Cases; President Says Doctors 
Are Leaving, HARTFORD COURANT, July 26, 2002,_ at A3, available at 2002 WL 24224973; Rob 
Stein, Increase in Physicians' Insurance Hurts Care; Service$ Are Being Pared, and Clinics Are 
Closing, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2003, at AOl, available at 2003 WL 2366088. This same argument 
has been used against proposals to allow increased damage awards for veterinary malpractice 
claims. See irifra notes 303--08 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that allowing non· 
economic damages in veterinary malpractice cases will result in less access to veterinary care). 
I 09. Robyn Suriano & Greg Groeller, Malpractice Rates Soar~octors Rethink Risks; 
Patients Are Caught in the Middle as Doctors Flee Florida To Avoid Rising Insurance Costs, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 100141438. For example, 
according to one in,surance provider in Aorida, one out of every forty-four doctors settles a 
malpractice claim nationwide compared with one out every eighteen doctors in Florida. ld~ 
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malpractice cases."110 In contrast, lawyers representing patients point 
to poor management and investment losses by. insurance carriers along 
with market forces that kept premiums artificially low in the early 
1990s.111 Early efforts at tort reform occurred at the state level, with a 
majority of the states enacting legislation. 112 The tort reform provisions 
often consisted of statutory caps on damages in response to concerns 
over high and inconsistent non-economic losses, though there were 
other provisions adopted in an attempt to make the litigation process 
more efficient and to screen out non-meritorious cases. 113 In addition to 
110. MacDonald, supra note 108. Studies cited by the AMA state that "median jury awards 
increased 43 percent [in 2001]" and that "half of all jury awards in malpractice cases top $1 
million." /d. Another problem is the increasing number of insurance companies that are leaving 
the malpractice market and causing physicians to scramble for coverage. See Kris Hundley, 
Prognosis for Trouble, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. II, 2002, at 8E (reporting the withdrawal 
of St. Paul Company, the second largest malpractice insurer in the United States, from the market 
and noting other insurance carriers that were leaving the Florida market), available at 2002 WL 
15926502. Other factors have been cited as causes of the malpractice crisis, including unrealistic 
expectations of patients, fear of overly sympathetic responses from juries leading to settlements 
for cases that may be non-meritorious, and the contingent fee system. Sokol, supra note 80, at 
442-45. 
Ill. Suriano & Groeller, supra note 109 (discussing insurance coverage and the malpractice 
crisis in Aorida); Frank Todaro, What's the Key to the Medical-nzalpractice Dilemma?, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2002, at 19A (citing to failed insurance profits from poor 
investments as one reason for the crisis), available at 2002 WL 100598241; Refuting the Myth 
That Iowa Is a Litigious State , IOWA LAW., Nov. 2002, at 9-10 (discussing a task force that was 
set up in Iowa to detennine the medical malpractice situation in the state and raising the 
possibility that malpractice rates are increasing "because of insurance industry pricing errors, lost 
investment income, and the premium price war in the 1990s with the off-the-map stock market 
covering the spread"). As one commentator states: 
[T]he most central argument against the caps for health care providers is that if there is 
a crisis ... the problem is theirs and not that of an individual victim of their 
negligence; and that while government might provide assistance to the providers, the 
individual victim should not be forced to do so. 
DAN B. DOBBS, LAWS OF REMEDIES DAMAGES EQUITY RESTITUTION 526-27 (2d ed. 1993). 
112. Chupkovich, supra note I 04, at 338 (stating that twenty-seven states enacted legislation). 
113. /d. at 353 & n.ll9 (discussing tort refonn and non-economic damages); see also Neasbitt 
v. Warren, 22 S.W.3d 107, 111-12 (Tex. App. 2000) (discussing the Texas Medical Liability and 
Insurance Improvement Act and stating that the original act, "passed in 1977, sought to address a 
'medical malpractice insurance crisis in the State of Texas"' (citation omitted)); Sokol, supra 
note 80, at 445--48 (discussing responses to the malpractice crisis, including arbitration, screening 
panels, and proposing the greater use of countersuit litigation to alleviate the crisis). See 
generally infra Part V.C (discussing various provisions that could be adopted to encourage 
settlement of meritorious cases and to block frivolous claims in veterinary malpractice cases). 
Constitutional challenges to these state tort refonn acts followed, with courts split on their 
validity. RobertS. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. Sr. 
U. L. REv. 397, 416-19 (2000) (discussing constitutional rights that are arguably impacted by a 
tort refonn act passed in Florida in 1999); Studdert, supra note 106, at 241--45 (discussing 
constitutional challenges to tort reform acts). Some courts have found that key provisions of the 
statutes were invalid based on state constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, jury 
trials, or open courts. DOBBS, supra note Ill, at 526-27; Studdert, supra note I 06, at 243 (citing 
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tort reform at the state level, efforts have been made to pass federal 
legislation to address the crisis. 114 
In comparison to medical as well as other professional malpractice 
claims, the veterinary profession appears to be in a relatively good 
position. As discussed above, insurance rates for veterinary malpractice 
have been steady over the last decade, unlike medical and legal 
malpractice rates. 115 The veterinary malpractice insurance industry has 
not made distinctions by geographic location and is not as practice 
specific as other professions are. Given this information, why should 
there be any concern over the current standards that are applied in 
veterinary malpractice actions? First, from the perspective of 
veterinarians, there has been an increase in malpractice claims, and 
there are reports of settlements with damages in higher amounts than 
was customarily found in the past. 116 Veterinarians have concerns 
about the litigation system similar to those of physicians. Second, from 
the perspective of clients, the remedies available under the current 
system do not reflect the importance of the relationship between 
humans and their animal companions.1 17 Finally, for both sides 
to Garty T. Schwartz, Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem American Tort Law, 
26 GA. L. REV. 601,683 n.435 (1992)). 
114. The most recent federal legislation is the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely 
Healthcare ("HEALTH") Act of 2002. H.R. 4600, 1 07th Cong. (2002). Section 2 of the 
HEALTH Act lists the effects on interstate commerce and federal spending to support the Act. 
Supporters of the HEALTH Act say that federal legislation providing damage caps in health care 
lawsuits is necessary because the rising insurance premiums cause physicians in high·risk 
specialties to leave their specialty or move to states that have caps. A report by the Department of 
Health and Human Services states that the federal cap could cut patients' medical costs by as 
much as 30o/o. MacDonald, supra note 108. The HEALTH Act provides for a standard three-
year statute of limitations (or one year after discovery) to encourage speedy resolution of claims. 
H.R. 4600, § 3. The HEALTH Act provides that full economic losses may be recovered but caps 
non-economic damages at $250,000 for each occurrence. /d. § 4. The cap on non-economic 
damages applies "regardless of the number of parties against whom the action is brought or the 
number of separate claims or actions brought with respect to the same occurrence." /d. Punitive 
damages are also capped at the greater of double the economic damages awarded or $250,000. 
/d. § 7(b). Finally there are provisions governing attorneys' fees and the disclosure of collateral 
source benefits. /d. §§ 5-6. 
115. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing veterinary malpractice 
insurance rates in comparison to medical malpractice rates); supra note 103 (noting the increase 
in legal malpractice rates). 
116. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 43 (discussing an increase in veterinary claims and 
media reports of damage awards that are higher than market value). Malpractice carriers are 
similarly in a potentially precarious position. Although they can spread risk among many 
veterinarians, these companies are also at risk of at least short-tenn losses if numerous significant 
damage awards are assessed against their insured before the companies are able to take such 
losses into account in their pricing. 
117. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between humans 
and companion animals). 
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involved in these types of claims, there is a growing uncertainty about 
the remedies that are available. Providing more consistency in the 
damages available in these cases allows both parties to understand fully 
the ramifications of their actions if malpractice occurs and, if necessary, 
to adjust their behavior accordingly. 
III. VETERINARY MALPRACTICE 
The goals of tort actions are to "compensate victims, affirm social 
values, and deter wrongdoers."118 Two primary public policies 
supporting the application of malpractice ,principles to veterinarians are 
to protect the public and to discourage unqualified individuals from 
representing themselves as qualified veterinarians. 119 It is important to 
distinguish between claims of malpractice and negligence.120 If a 
veterinarian is acting in a manner outside of his or her professional 
capacity, a normal negligence standard will be used. 121 An example of 
these types of actions relating to animals include veterinarians providing 
118. Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in 
Tort, 10 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1995). There is increasing evidence that medical 
malpractice lawsuits do not reduce medical errors. Barry Manuel, A Threat to Reducing Medical 
Errors, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2001, at Al5 (reporting on studies of the effect of malpractice 
suits and stating that "medical malpractice suits neither improve medical care nor offer justice to 
most injured patients"), available at 2001 WL 3926734. 
119. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 16. 
120. One reason it is important to distinguish between negligence and malpractice actions is 
that if the lawsuit is based in negligence (rather than malpractice) expert medical testimony will 
not be required. Moses v. Richardson, No. 0035312,2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1154, at *8 
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2001) (affinning judgment against veterinarians when a horse was 
seriously injured during a treadmill procedure); Savo v. Kazlauska, No. CV-9501274438, 1999 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 314, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1999) (denying summary judgment for 
a veterinarian in a negligence action where a horse kicked the plaintiff when the veterinarian 
argued as an affinnative defense that the cause of action sounded in veterinary malpractice and 
thus required an expert to set the applicable standard of care); Smith v. Hugo, 714 So. 2d 467, 
468 (Aa. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (affirrning verdict in favor of a client who was bitten by cat during 
vaccination and finding that the jury instruction for ordinary neglige,nce was appropriate). 
Veterinarians are also sued under various other theories, such as misrepresentation, Bobin v. 
Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *8, *11 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995) 
(alleging, among other things, misrepresentation in connection with recordkeeping in a negligent 
post-operative care case); breach of contract, Brumfield v. Richardson, No. 0036348, 2002 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 3841, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002) (alleging breach of an oral 
agreement relating to the castration of a horse); and violation of a state's deceptive trade practices 
act, Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996) (alleging a violation of the Texas 
deceptive trade practices act over a statement made by a veterinarian that he "would be able to 
adequately handle" a neutering procedure). See generally L. Leon Geyer, Malpractice and 
Liability, 23 VETERINARY CLINICS N. AM: SMALL ANIMAL PRAC. 1027 (1993) (discussing and 
distinguishing malpractice and negligence theories of liability for veterinarians). 
121. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237; see also McAdams v. Faulk, No. CA01-
1350, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *7 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (distinguishing between 
general negligence and malpractice claims). 
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boarding facilities or transportation services. 122 Veterinarians also may 
be subject to claims of negligence if a client is injured (often bitten) 
while the veterinarian treats the client's animal. 123 In addition, 
veterinarians can be subject to negligence claims not relating to animals, 
such as slip and fall actions on their property. 124 
Malpractice claims are appropriate if the issues relate to specialized 
skills not ordinarily possessed by lay people specifically, the medical 
skills of the veterinarian. 125 Essentially, malpractice is a specialized 
professional negligence or "bad practice due to a lack of skill or the 
failure to apply it." 126 Initially, claims based on malpractice applied 
only to specific professionals such as doctors and lawyers. 127 Many 
courts have applied the malpractice standards established for doctors by 
analogy to veterinarians, even without specific statutory authority. 128 
122. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237; see also Harold W. Hannah, Veterinarians 
as Bailees, 216 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1068 (2000) (discussing the standard of care for 
bailees). 
123. See Countryman v. Lester, 183 N.E.2d 727, 728 (Mass. 1962) (holding that a veterinarian 
was not liable in a negligence action for bite injuries inflicted on the plaintiff-client by her cat 
during the cat' s treatment); Branks v. Kern, 359 S.E.2d 780, 783 (N.C. 1987) (finding that a 
veterinarian was not liable under a negligence theory when the client's cat bit her during the eat's 
treatment). Professors Favre and Borchelt report that, according to one insurance company, 
"during the 1990s injuries to humans represented 18% of the claims against veterinarians." 
FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 247 n.l2. Dr. Soave reports that about 20% of the 2000 
malpractice and negligence cases brought to court against veterinarians each year involve injuries 
to human beings that are caused by animals under the care of such veterinarians. SOAVE, supra 
note 14, at 21. Damage awards can be significant, especially in cases where injuries have 
occurred in connection with the treatment of horses. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1021 (stating 
that 13.7% of injuries to humans were caused by horses but the costs associated with such claims 
equal 41.4% of the total incurred losses). The breakdown for injuries from other animals is as 
follows: 39.6% of the injuries and 19.7o/o of the costs are caused by dogs and 28.8o/o of the 
injuries and 15.6% of the costs are caused by cats. /d. These types of cases could be considered 
malpractice rather than simple negligence if the harm occurs because of the type or manner in 
which the veterinarian applies medical treatment; however, the focus of this Article is on the 
damages that arise due to the injury or death of the patients rather than clients or others who may 
be involved in the treatment process. 
124. See, e.g., Hallberg v. Flat Creek Animal Clinic, 483 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) 
(illustrating this type of action in an unsuccessful negligence claim against a veterinary clinic for 
injuries suffered when a client fell on a ramp leading out of the clinic). 
125. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237. 
126. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 14. Malpractice may be willful as well as negligent. /d. 
127. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 236. 
128. Ladnier v. Norwood, 781 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing to Louisiana cases that 
adopted the medical malpractice standard for veterinarian malpractice prior to the adoption of 
statutory provisions clarifying the standard); Williamson v. Prida, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868, 872 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (applying a medical malpractice standard of care to veterinary malpractice and citing 
to other courts that held the same); Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Pa. 1996) (extending 
professional negligence concepts to veterinary medicine); see also Harold W. Hannah, What Is 
the Standard of Care for a Veterinarian and Does Departure from It Always Spell Liability?, 218 
J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1090 (2001). Several early cases stated that a claim for 
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There are still a few states where courts have been reluctant to apply 
"malpractice" standards to veterinarians without statutory authority. 129 
One basis used to reject the application of malpractice standards to 
veterinarians is that the patient-physician relationship (or presumably 
the attorney-client relationship) that exists at the core of a malpractice 
claim is not found in veterinary medicine. 130 Instead there is a 
relationship between the veterinarian and the client who in turn owns 
the patient. Presumably, since animals are considered personal 
property, these courts would find the relationship between a customer 
and automobile mechanic more analogous. Just as a car does not have 
the ability to sue a mechanic, an animal does not have the ability to sue 
his or her veterinarian. 131 The client, who holds a legal interest in the 
animal, maintains the right to sue over the injury or destruction of his or 
her property as animals currently do not have standing to bring suits on 
their own behalf in any situation. 132 
Notwithstanding these cases, unless otherwise indicated, the 
discussion in this Article centers on the special type of negligence based 
veterinary malpractice was made without clarifying the standards to be set. See, e.g., Conner v. 
Winton, 8 Ind. 289, 289 (1856) (describing the case as one in which Connor sued Winton for 
unskillfully treating a horse). The Conner case is described by one author as the "first 
malpractice case in the United States against a veterinarian." SOAVE, supra note 14, at 13. Other 
early cases applied a professional standard of care without further comment. Barney v. Pinkham, 
45 N. W. 694, 694 (Neb. 1890) (stating that a veterinary surgeon is bound to use "such reasonable 
skill, diligence, and attention as may be ordinarily expected of persons in that profession"). 
129. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Conklin, 669 N.E.2d 563, 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (declining to 
extend a malpractice statute of limitations to veterinarians and citing to a line of Ohio cases in 
which the courts refused to extend the definition of malpractice to professions not enumerated in 
statutes). But see Bowles v. Singh, No. CA99-I0-094, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3410, at *7 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 31, 2000) (applying the standard of care of a "veterinarian of ordinary skill, care 
and diligence"); Turner v. Sinha, 582 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (applying a 
professional standard of care to a claim of negligence by a veterinarian). 
130. Southhall v. Gabel , 277 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (discussing the physician-
patient relationship between the veterinarian and animal and stating that "[u]ntil the [Ohio] 
Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice"). 
Notwithstanding the fact that malpractice would not be applicable, Ohio courts have used 
analogies between injuries to persons and injuries to animals in negligence actions. Southall v. 
Gabel, 293 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Franklin County, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972) (finding that where alleged 
damage to a horse is an injury that results in physical or mental disability, it is necessary to prove 
the causal connection between the injury and disability in the same way as when the injury is to a 
person and such causal connection must be established by the opinion of competent medical 
witnesses); see also Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that the 
court would adopt the standard applied to physicians and surgeons in medical malpractice cases 
for veterinary negligence cases). But see Pruitt v. Box, 984 S. W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. App. 1998) 
(rejecting the Downing analysis and applying a general negligence standard utilizing a standard of 
care "applicable to a professional of ordinary skill and care in similar communities"). 
131. See Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 68-79 (discussing the legal status 
of animals and the possibility of treating animals as "persons" for limited purposes). 
132. /d. at 79-83 (analyzing the issue of standing as it relates to animals). 
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on the professional medical skills of the veterinarian that result in injury 
or harm to a patient, whether the standard is set by analogy to medical 
malpractice or as "professional negligence."133 
Just as with other tort actions, the plaintiff will have the burden of 
proving the essential elements of the claim. In a malpractice action, the 
elements are as follows: (a) the veterinarian owed a duty of care toward 
the animal, (b) the veterinarian did not conforrn to the standard of 
conduct required by those in the profession, (c) such non-conforming 
conduct is the proximate cause of the injury or harm, and (d) the injury 
or harm resulted in damages to the plaintiff.134 The damages that arise 
are due to either the injury or harm to the property of the client (the 
animal) or to the client as an individual. 
A. Standard of Care 
Of these elements, an issue that some courts are continuing to 
struggle with is the applicable standard of care in veterinary malpractice 
cases. As stated above, the standards used for medical malpractice 
cases are often applied by analogy to veterinary malpractice cases; 
however, significant differences in the professions may impact the 
standard. 135 
Clearly, the treatment a veterinarian will provide varies depending on 
the animal involved.136 The type and value of the animal will control 
the treatment provided to the anima1.137 An animal that is used for food 
production will receive different treatment from a beloved animal 
• 
com pant on. 
The nature of the patients also impacts the level of treatment. Many 
veterinarians treat several different species of animals with a wide 
spectrum of problems. 138 Communication is limited with the patients so 
133. See Pruitt, 984 S.W.2d at 711 (applying a general negligence standard utilizing a 
standard of care "applicable to a professional of ordinary skill and care in similar communities"). 
134. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237. 
135. See King, supra note 95, at 6. 
136. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 15. 
137. /d. 
138. /d.; see also AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N, VETERINARY MARKET STATISTICS, at 
http://www.avma.org/membshp/marketstats/usvets.asp (Sept. 2002) (showing the breakdown of 
practice areas for veterinarians, with the majority of private clinical veterinarians designating 
their practices as "small animal exclusive" or "small animal predominant"). The implication of 
the treatment of multiple species appears to be that the veterinarian's knowledge of each species 
may be lessened. The treatment of multiple species, as well as the extreme variations in size and 
weight, make it more difficult to detennine proper medication dosages, increasing the likelihood 
that claims will be brought because the drugs were improperly prescribed or administered. 
Harold W. Hannah, Veterinary Medical Malpractice and Medical Malpractice: Some Parallels 
and Differences, 202 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1819, 1820 (1993). One implication for 
• 
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it can be more difficult to define problems. 139 Another obvious 
difference is the legal and acceptable use of euthanasia on animals, as 
well as the economic limitations applied to the treatment of many 
animals.140 
One articulation of the standard of care that is commonly applied to 
veterinary malpractice claims is whether 
the injury complained of was caused by the doing of a particular thing 
that a veterinarian of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have 
done under like or similar circumstances, or by the failure or omission 
to do some particular thing that such a veterinarian would have done 
under like or similar circumstances. 141 
Essentially, the standard of care is one set by the actions of other 
professionals in the same position, rather than a standard set by 
laypersons. 142 It is important to recognize that the standard is not set by 
the actions of the most skilled veterinarians-merely ones that are 
considered average or normai. 143 
Expert testimony is generally necessary in order to determine 
whether a veterinarian has complied with this professional standard of 
care.144 As in other negligence actions, research literature and other 
the lower expectation for the care provided by a "general practitioner" is that specialists have 
been held to a higher standard of care. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. The 
percentage of general practitioners in the veterinary profession is higher than the percentage of 
general practitioners in the medical profession. Hannah, supra, at 1820. 
139. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 15. 
140. /d.; WILSON, supra note 14, at 137. 
141. Turner v. Sinha, 582 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (setting forth a standard in 
a case that actually was not defined as malpractice); see also King, supra note 95, at 10. 
142. King, supra note 95, at 12-18. 
143. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 238; see also Barney v. Pinkham, 45 N.W. 694, 
694 (Neb. 1890) (stating that a veterinary surgeon "does not contract to use the highest degree of 
skill , nor an extraordinary amount of diligence, but to exercise a reasonable degree of knowledge, 
diligence and attention"). 
144. WILSON, supra note 14, at 137; see also Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 388-
93 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing expert testimony in a veterinary malpractice action); Bekkemo v. 
Erickson, 242 N.W. 617, 618-19 (Minn. 1932) (discussing expert witnesses and expert witness 
fees in a case alleging negligence by a veterinarian); Zimmerman v. Robertson, 854 P.2d 338, 340 
(Mont. 1993) (finding that expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care in a 
veterinary malpractice action); Fackler v. Genetzky, 638 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Neb. 2002) (stating 
that "[m]edical expert testimony regarding causation ... must be stated as being at least 
' probable,' in other words, more likely than not" in a veterinary malpractice case); Durocher v. 
Rochester Equine Clinic, 629 A.2d 827, 829 (N.H. 1993) (finding that expert testimony from a 
veterinarian is necessary to prove the elements of causation and harm in veterinary malpractice 
cases); McGee v. Smith, 107 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App. 2003) (discussing the standard of care and 
the need for expert testimony in a veterinary malpractice action). Note that if a locality rule is 
applied, it may be difficult to obtain this expert testimony. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, 
at 239. Plaintiffs may also be required to fulfill statutory requirements, such as the filing of an 
expert affidavit, to proceed with veterinary malpractice actions. Collins v. Newman, 517 S.E.2d 
HeinOnline -- 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 505 2003-2004 
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sources, such as warning labels, can assist in establishing the standard 
of care. 145 Additionally, state veterinary medical associations or 
veterinary medical practice acts can establish the standard of care. 146 
Although the A VMA has not adopted specific practice standards, it does 
have fourteen general guidelines for practice, and the AVMA's PLIT 
has a survey that lists twenty-nine desirable practices in a veterinary 
clinic. 147 An inference can also be made that a veterinarian has not met 
the applicable standard of care if the actions alleged are the types listed 
in statutes that support the revocation of a veterinarian's license.148 
Notwithstanding the application of a professional standard of care, it 
is possible to establish a prima facie case if the "very nature of the acts 
complained of bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice."149 The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied in veterinary malpractice· 
cases, but only if the injury complained of is of a kind that does not 
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, and other responsible 
causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. 150 An example of 
the application of this doctrine is an injury resulting from a veterinarian 
leaving a surgical instrument or sponge in an animal that has undergone 
surgery. 151 
100, 101-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that section 9-11-9.1 of the Georgia Annotated Code 
required the filing of an expert affidavit in a veterinary malpractice case in which the plaintiff 
alleged that instruments were left inside a dog during a spaying procedure). 
145. Ladnier v. Norwood, 781 F.2d 4907 493 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing research literature 
and product manufacturer recommendations to support a finding that a veterinarian was not 
negligent in the administration of a medication); Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Iowa 
1973) (using contraindications enclosed with a vaccine to set the standard of care in a lawsuit 
over the deaths of pregnant gilts after vaccination); Carter v. La. State Univ., 520 So. 2d 383, 388 
(La. 1988) (finding that medical records kept by veterinary students supported the testimony of 
the plaintiff). 
146. Harold W. Hannah, Common Law and Statutory Defenses to a Veterinary Medical 
Malpractice Action, 206 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1703, 1703 (1995) [hereinafter 
Hannah, Defenses]. 
147. Harold W. Hannah, Establishing the Standard of Care, 208 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. 
ASS'N 1034 (1996) [hereinafter Hannah, Standard of Care]. Note that the ability of a licensing 
board to set the standard of care has been challenged with mixed results from the courts. ld, at 
1035. 
148. /d. at 1034. 
149. Mathew v. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (App. Term. 1998) (citing to Restrepo v. 
State, 550 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1989), and finding that no expert is necessary to explain that a 
veterinarian should x-ray a dog if she suspects that the dog has swallowed something). 
150. Mires v. Evans, No. 82-4436, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *31-*33 (E.D. Pa. July 
21, 1986) (discussing the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). The "other 
responsible causes" would include the conduct of the plaintiff and other third persons. /d. at *32-
*33. 
151. Hannah, Standard of Care, supra note 147, at 1035. 
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One rule courts have utilized to set the standard of care is referred to 
as the "locality rule." 152 The locality rule evaluates the conduct of a 
professional by considering the professional standards in the geographic 
area where the professional practices. 153 The geographic area may be as 
narrow as the immediate locality or as large as a national standard.154 
Courts have also considered the care practiced in a particular or like 
community as one of the elements to be used in setting the standard.155 
The locality rule can impact liability by limiting the pool of available 
experts to opine on the applicable standard, and such standard may be 
narrower than in a jurisdiction that applies a national standard. 156 Just 
as with the medical profession, with the increasing access to 
information and continuing professional education requirements, it 
appears the veterinary profession should adopt a more unifonn 
standard. 157 A more general uniform standard promotes higher levels of 
competence within the profession. 158 
Notwithstanding any applicable geographic limitation, veterinarians 
who hold themselves out as specialists in a particular aspect of 
veterinary practice should be held to the standards of other specialists in 
that field. 159 One difficulty in determining the standard of care for this 
area of malpractice is that some practitioners specialize in a species or 
type of veterinary practice while others are actually board certified 
specialists. 160 Regardless of board certification, veterinarians who are 
considered specialists will likely be held to a higher standard of care 
than generalists. 161 
152. King, supra note 95, at 18- 21. 
153. ld. at 19. 
154. /d. An interim standard can be referred to as the "same or similar" locality. /d. 
155. Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Iowa 1973) (rejecting the locality rule and 
stating that the standard of care practiced in a particular community can be one of the elements 
considered though it is not conclusive). 
156. King, supra note 95, at 19. See generally FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 239 
(discussing policy considerations supporting a general standard of national or statewide scope 
rather than a more narrow locality rule). 
157. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 239. Professors Favre and Borchelt would 
caution that an exception to such a standard could be related to access to advanced equipment. /d. 
The trend is to move away from the application of a narrow locality rule. WILSON, supra note 14, 
at 136; see also Carter v. La. State Univ. , 520 So. 2d 383, 387 (La. 1988) (rejecting the use of a 
locality standard for a malpractice case involving a veterinary specialist). 
158. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 239. 
159. /d.; King, supra note 95, at 17; see also Restrepo v. State, 550 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 41 (Ct. 
Cl. 1989) (discussing the application of the locality rule and applying a standard of care set by 
other racetrack veterinarians). 
160. WILSON, supra note 14, at 139. 
161. /d. at 140. Note that generalists can also be found negligent if they fail to refer a patient 
to a specialist in some situations. Harold W. Hannah, Knowing the Limits of One's Skill-
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There is also a temporal frame of reference used to evaluate 
professional services. 162 The standard of care is one that existed at the 
time of the alleged malpractice.163 Veterinarians, like other 
professionals, are not held to standards developed or adopted by 
practitioners subsequent to the treatment at issue. 
It is important to note that the standard of care is reasonable 
professional competence, not merely errors in j-udgment.164 There is no 
guarantee of a particular result of treatment (unless a guarantee or 
warranty is independently provided).165 There is no presumption of 
malpractice even if injury or death occurs after treatment. 166 
Malpractice can be found with omissions in treatment as well as the 
commission of acts relating to treatment.167 Although omissions in 
treatment occur more frequently than the commission of incorrect 
treatment, it is generally easier to prove malpractice if there has been 
improper treatment. 168 Given the role of clients in determining the 
extent of medical treatment, it can be difficult to measure the 
appropriate level of treatment. 169 
B. Types of Malpractice Claims 
Malpractice claims have been based on allegations of improper 
treatment in a variety of areas. Unskillful surgeries and improper post-
surgical care are common claims.170 Problems with vaccinations also 
Referrals, 210 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 31, 31 (1997). If a veterinarian calls in a 
consultant and is guided by such consultant's advice, the veterinarian will be liable for the 
consultant's negligence as well as his or her own negligence. /d. at 32. 
162. King, supra note 95, at 21. 
163. /d.; see, e.g., Mires v. Evans, No. 82-4436, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *30 (E.D. 
Pa. July 21, 1986) (stating that in judging the degree of skill, regard is to be had to the advanced 
state of the profession at the time); Williams v. Reynolds, 263 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1980) (discussing the excluded testimony of a veterinarian who did not live in the county during 
the month that an alleged malpractice occurred). 
164. King, supra note 95, at 22. 
., 
165. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 238 ("The standard does not make the 
veterinarian an insurer of the recovery of an animal."). 
166. /d. at 238; see also Mires, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *29 (stating that "no 
presumption or inference of negligence arises merely because the medical treatment of a 
racehorse yields a bad result"). 
167. WILSON, supra note 14, at 136-37. 
168. /d. at 137. 
169. /d. 
170. E.g., Bob in v. Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
May 17, 1995) (alleging negligent post-operative care); Collins v. Newman, 517 S.E.2d 100, 10 I 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (alleging that a veterinarian left medical instruments inside a dog during a 
spaying procedure); Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 610 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (alleging 
negligence in spaying a dog); Zimmern1an v. Robertson, 854 P.2d 338, 339 (Mont. 1993) 
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have frequently formed the basis for malpractice claims. 171 Similarly, it 
is not uncommon for courts to consider malpractice claims alleging the 
misuse or improper administration of medications or drugs. 172 
Not only have claims been based on allegations of improper 
treatment but the failure to inform a client of the availability of alternate 
treatments and disclose the risks involved in treatments can be used to 
support malpractice claims. 173 For example, the failure to inform an 
owner about the necessary care for an animal after its release from a 
veterinarian's care can support a malpractice action. 174 Malpractice 
claims also have arisen from alleged errors in the confinement or 
restraint of animals during treatment, as restraint can be considered an 
integral part of the practice of veterinary medicine. 175 
Occasionally, a veterinarian can be held liable if he or she does not 
follow up on treatment when the veterinarian has a duty to do so, either 
by circumstances or because he or she has agreed to continue 
(alleging negligent surgical and post-surgical care of a colt after castration); DeCurtis-Slifkin v. 
Kolbert, 668 N.Y.S.2d 949, 949 (App. Div~ 1989) (alleging negligence in the discharge of an 
animal while it was partially sedated); Williams v. Reyonds, 263 S.E.2d 853, 853 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1980) (alleging negligent post-surgical care of a castrated horse); Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 
181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996) (alleging negligence in the administration of anesthesia, in a neutering 
operation). 
171. E.g., Grei ves v. Greenwood,. 550 N .E.2d 334, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (alleging the 
negligent injection of cattle with a brucellosis vaccine); Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 715 
(Iowa 1973) (alleging that a veterinarian used an improper vaccination on pregnant gilts); Phillips 
v. Leuth, 204 N.W. 301, 302 (Iowa 1925) (alleging blood poisoning caused by improper 
vaccination); see also Duane Flemming, The Potential for Liability in the Use and Misuse of 
Veterin(lry Vaccines, 31 VETERINARY CLINICS N. AM.: SMALL ANIMAL PRAC. 515 (200 l) 
(discussing liability issues relating to the use of vaccinations). 
172. E.g., Ladnier v. Norwood, 781 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1986) (alleging improper 
administration of medication containing vitamin E); Kerbow v. Bell, 259 P.2d 317, 318 (Okla. 
1953) (alleging that a dip used to treat mange_ was too strong, causing the death of dogs); 
Erickson v. Webber, 237 N.W. 558, 559 (S.D. 1931) (alleging improper administration of a 
wonning treatment, causing the death of sheep). 
173. Emes Stable v. Univ. of Penn., No. 85-5402, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS2972, at *I (E.D. 
Pa. Apr~ 4,. 1988) (alleging malpractice when a veterinarian operated on a horse before informing 
its owner of all alternative available treatments); Hemming, supra note 171, at 518-20 
(discussing infonned consent issues and stating that the current inforrned consent standard is the 
"reasonable pati_ent standard"). 
174. Hannah, supra note 41, at 1419. Malpractice claims may also arise from dispensation of 
prescription drugs, security for prescription drugs, and the failure to warn a client if the client 
assists in an examination, as there is a risk that the client could be injured. Id. In addition~ there 
may be circumstances in which a veterinarian must warn someone or report that an animal has a 
communicable disease. /d. at 1420. 
175. Beck v. Henkle-Craig Livestock Co., 88 S.E. 865, 866 (N.C. 1916) (alleging malpractice 
in the way in which a mule was put into a stall in preparation for surgery); Harold W. Hannah, 
Malpractice Implications of Animal Restraint, 214 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 41, 41 
(1999) (discussing cases in which restraint was part of a malpractice claim). Improper restraint 
may also contribute to human injury. /d. 
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treatment.176 It is important to note that veterinarians are under no legal 
obligation to accept a case, even in an emergency. 177 This does not 
mean that a veterinarian's refusal to accept a case will not violate the 
ethical standards set by the veterinary community, just that a legal cause 
of action does not arise from such a refusal.178 It is only when a 
relationship has been established for the care. of an animal that a 
veterinarian can be held liable for the abandonment of such animal's 
. . . . 
care.179 Given the increased availability of specialists, a veterinarian 
can also be liable if he or she fails to refer a client to a specialist in 
appropriate circumstances. 180 
C. Defenses to Malpractice Claims 
Just like defendants in other actions brought under tort law, 
veterinarians have a variety of common defenses-to malpractice claims. 
The negation of any of the elements of this cause of action defeats the 
malpractice claim. Thus, the veterinarian could show that he or she was 
not under a duty of care to the patient b.ecause no relationship had been 
entered into at the time of the alleged malpractice. Obviously, the lack 
176. Restrepo v. State, 550 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (Ct. Cl. 1989) (alleging negligence when a 
racetrack veterinarian left a needle in a horse's jugular vein); Boom v. Reed, 23 N.Y.S. 421, 422 
(Gen. Term 1893) (alleging that a veterinarian was negligent when he did not return as· promised 
to treat a sick horse). 
177. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 21. Some states have adopted Good Samaritan laws to protect 
veterinarians who take on the care of an animal in emergency situations. E.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 333.18826 (West 2001) (limiting liability for civil damages to acts amounting to 
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct when providing treatment to an animal where 
the ownership of such animal is unknown at the time of the treatment); N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 6705-
a (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2004) (providing_ that veterinarians who provide emergency 
treatment outside of an animal hospital or clinic will not be liable for damages relating to the 
animal's injury or death). 
178. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 238; see, e.g., In re Kerlin, 376 A.2d 939, 942-
43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (appealing the decision of the Board of Veterinary Medical 
Examiners' (the "Board") that a veterinarian was guilty of "gross malpractice or gross neglect" in 
a case in which his office assistant allegedly refused to treat an ill kitten). In the Kerlin case, the 
Board· held "that a veterinarian is expected to exhibit professional interest, compassion and 
empathy." Id. at 942. The Board detennined that a veterinarian who does not make a preliminary 
inquiry to detennine the need for emergency care or humane treatment would substantially 
deviate from the standards of the profession. /d. at 942-43. The court found, however, that the 
lack of qualities such as compassion and empathy would not "standing alone" constitute gross 
malpractice or· gross neglect. /d. at 944. The court found that even if it adopted the Board's 
definition of grossly neglectful treatment, there was no proof that the veterinarian "refused to treat 
or examine, or ... [that] he did not allow his employees to examine or treat the kitten." /d. 
179. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 21;_ cf. RICHARD M. PATTERSON, HARNEY'S MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE§ 5.8 (4th ed. 1999) ("It is a basic rule in the medical profession that having once 
undertaken the care of a patient, a physician may not neglect him."). 
180. Geyer, supra note 120, at 1034 (discussing theories underlying veterinary malpractice 
claims). 
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of this element is more likely to be raised in situations involving the 
omission by a veterinarian; however, as stated above, veterinarians are 
not legally required to treat any animal before they have accepted a 
case.181 The second element, the veterinarian's failure to conform to 
the standard of conduct, can be rebutted by proving that the veterinarian 
did not act negligently. The defendant veterinarian can use the same 
types of evidence as the plaintiff can. 182 
A defendant can neutralize the third element by showing either that 
the harm would have occurred regardless of the veterinarian's actions or 
that there was another reason for the injury. For example, a veterinarian 
may be able to show that the client did not medicate or care for the 
animal as the veterinarian had prescribed. 183 The final element, that 
injury or harrn has occurred, is at the heart of this Article. As discussed 
below, there are currently limitations on the value placed on animals; 
thus, the financial harm to the client is usually quite limited. 184 
Regardless, to reduce any damages, a veterinarian can show that the 
injury or harm is not as significant as the client alleges. 
In addition to fighting the lawsuit based on the elements of the claim, 
veterinarians also have other possible defenses. 185 Plaintiffs must file 
their claims for veterinary malpractice within the appropriate 
statute of limitations. 186 State statutes generally set limitation 
181. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (noting that veterinarians are not legally 
obligated to accept an animal for care). 
182. Hannah, Defenses, supra note 146, at 1703 (discussing evidentiary uses to make or 
defend a case); supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that can be used in 
veterinary malpractice cases to establish the requisite standard of care). 
183. Hannah, Defenses, supra note 146, at 1703 (discussing the use of contributory and 
comparative negligence as defenses). 
184. See generally infra Part IV (discussing the types of damages that are awarded in 
veterinary malpractice actions). 
185. Under certain circumstances, it may be possible to use evidence of a habit as a defense in 
veterinary malpractice actions. Harold W. Hannah, Habit as a Defense in a Veterinary 
Malpractice Suit, 211 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1129, 1129 (1997). Habit can be defined 
as "how an individual responds to a recurring situation." /d. A habit can be something that is 
either never done or always done, but the party asserting the habit must show that the conduct is 
semi-automatic or perfonned as a matter of course. !d. 
186. See, e.g., Storozuk v. W.A. Butler Co., 203 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1964) 
(finding that the practice of veterinary medicine would be included within the definition of 
malpractice for purposes of a one-year statute of limitations and sustaining a demurrer that barred 
action brought more than one year after services were perfonned); Satterwhite v. Weedn, 415 
S.W.2d 445, 446 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (upholding an instructed verdict on grounds that the 
suit was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations). Veterinarian defendants may be 
required to plead the statute of limitations as an affinnative defense. See, e.g., Lobrillo v. 
Brokken, 837 So. 2d I 059, 1061 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the statute of limitations must 
be raised in the answer as an affirrnative defense in a veterinary malpractice action). 
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periods.187 Statutory language is not always easy to interpret and can 
become_ a focus in the case. For example, in a veterinary malpractice 
case discussing the applicable statute of limitations, a Minnesota Court 
of Appeals found that the statute of limitations be-gan to run on the date 
when treatment for a particular condition ceased, rather than at the time 
of the negligent action or omission causing the injury.188 The court 
explained that the "termination of treatment" rule is used in medical 
malpractice cases because- the trust relationship between patient and 
physician inhibits the patient's ability to discover malpractice during 
treatment. 189 The same concerns were deemed to be equally present in 
veterinary malpractice cases, as both physicians and veterinarians ''deal 
with the investigation, prevention, cure and alleviation of disease."190 
The court found that animal owners rely on veterinarians during the 
course of treatment to support the application of the termination of 
treatment rule to veterinary malpractice cases. 191 
Other defenses can be tailored to specific claims. For example, if a 
veterinarian has evidence that a client granted infortned consent, a claim 
based on the type of treatment selected could be defeated. 192 It may be 
possible to argue that a client signed an exculpatory clause; however, 
courts have been reluctant to enforce these types of clauses. 193 Some 
' 
states also have statutory provisions that provide for specialized 
standards for professional negligence actions, and the failure to meet the 
standards can be used to defeat these types of claims. 194 
In claims that relate to injuries to humans,195 the common law 
defense of assumption of risk could be utilized. 196 The assumption of 
risk defense requires the veterinarian to show that the plaintiff knew of 
187. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (providing that all actions 
against veterinarians must _commence within two years). 
188. Berres v. Anderson, 561 N~W.2d 919, 922-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
189. /d. at 923. 
190. /d. 
191. ld. 
192. Hannah, Defenses, supra note 146, at 1703 (discussing infonned consent). 
193. /d. at 1703-04; see, e.g., Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 610 N.E.2d 177, 179-81 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1993) (construing an exculpatory clause narrowly to allow a veterinary malpractice claim to 
proceed)~ 
194. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114? 115 n.2 (Colo. 2001) (noting that the 
client did not file a certificate of review as required by Colorado law in a counterclaim for 
professional negligence); see also infra note 361 and accompanying text (noting statutory 
provisions requiring special procedures for claims of professional malpractice). 
195. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing injuries to clients that occurred 
during veterinarians' treatment of clients' animals). This issue is raised only because of the 
significant number of such claims, although these claims are not the focus of this Article. 
196. Hannah, Defenses~ supra note 146, at 1704~ 
" 
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the risk involved in what he or she did (c.ommonly the plaintiff was 
restraining or near the animal during treatment) and voluntarily assumed 
the risk. 197 Assuming that a client is able to prove successfully that 
veterinary malpractice occurred,-the next step in the process is to assess 
damages in the case. 198 
IV. DAMAGES 
Just as with other animal law issues, deterrruning the value of animals 
under the legal system has been the subject of increased legal 
commentary in recent years. 199 What the commentary in this area 
generally does not do is distinguish between intentional and negligent 
torts. Nor does the commentary consider whether a veterinarian should 
be held to a different standard of care given the veterin-arian's status as a 
professional and the fact that the client has entrusted an animal to the 
veterinarian's care. By necessity, due to the limited case law in the 
. . 
area, this Article will address damages available for the injury or death 
of anitnals regardless of the circumstances surrounding the claim. 
Where case law allows, the focus of the discussion of damages will be 
on those cases involving veterinary malpractice. 
197. Jd. 
198. Justas with other lawsuits, a veterinarian may be able to countersue under a variety of 
theories, including malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or breach of contract for unpaid fees. 
See generally Sokol, supra note 80 (discussing the use of countersuits in medical malpractice 
cases, most notably as a response to frivolous medical malpractice suits). 
199. See, e.g., Peter Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damages from the 
Negligent or Intentional Killing of Your Pet Dog or Cat?, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 411 (1989) 
(evalu~ting the market value approach and variations thereon to account for intrinsic measures of 
companion animal value); Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: 
Recognizing Pets' Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
31 (2001) (addressing issues of property value approaches to include other non-market value 
qualities of pets to assess damages for loss of pets); Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 
1; Squires-Lee, supra note 118 (proposing that the valuation of companion animals should not be 
wholly dependent upon a property classification); Waisman & Newel1, supra note 83; Steven M. 
Wise, Recovery of Common lAw Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of 
Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Cotnpariion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33 ( 1998) 
(proposing that compensation for loss of companion animals should parallel valuation and 
compensation methods used in cases where parents have lost a small child); S. Joseph Piazza, 
Note, Liability for the lnjU.ry and Destruction of Canines, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 78, 85-89 (1973) 
(proposing legal refonn to protect companion animals and to allow recovery by owners for more 
damages than just the market value of the pet); Janice M. Pintar, Comment, Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress and the Fair Market Value Approach in Wisconsin: The Case for Extending 
Tort Protection to Companion Animals and Their <Avners, 2002 WIS. L. Rev. 735 (proposing 
changes in tort law and the market value approach for companion animals); William C. Root, 
Note, "Man's Best Friend".~ Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal 
Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact 011 Damages Recoverable for Their 
Wrongful Death or Injury, 41 VILL. L. REv. 423 (2002) (arguing that companion pets should be 
valued as family members). This issue is not a new one for legal commentators. 
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A. Economic Damages 
Traditionally, the only damages available in malpractice claims were 
the economic damages that arose due to the injury or death of an 
animal. Clients who are deprived of the use of an animal can be 
c0mpensated for such loss, just as if any other piece of personal 
property were damaged or destroyed. Courts historically have used 
"fair market value" to establish the economic cost of an animal.200 This 
is based on the general rule that the value of person(l.l property is the 
market value itrunediately before and after the injury.201 A definition of 
market value as stated in one veterinary malpractice case is 
the amount that would be paid in cash by a willing buyer who desires 
to buy, but is not required to buy, to· a willing seller who desires to 
sell, but is under no necessity of selling. In considering market value, 
you may consider the highest and best use to which the animal may 
have been used.202 
If an animal is injured but not killed, the measure of damages is "the 
difference between the fair market value of the animal before the injury 
and its fair market value immediately after the injury."203 
Fair market value can be established in a number of ways. Certainly, 
the purchase price of an animal can be used as evidence of the value of 
the anima1.204 Any specialized training or skill that an animal has can 
be used for market value determination.205 Damages for "future 
200. Squires-Lee, supra note 118, at 1061. 
201. See Collins v. Ubanoski, No. B 14-88-00461-CV, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at *4 
(Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1989) (discussing the market value of a steer that died after a dehorning 
procedure (citing Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 228 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. 1950))); see also 
Ponder v. Angel Animal Hosp., 762 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that ~'the 
measure of damages to animals is their difference in fair market value before and after the injury" 
in a case where a veterinarian negligently castrated a dog). 
202. Collins, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at *4; see also Schrubbe v. Peninsula Veterinary 
Serv. Inc., 552 N. W .2d 634, 636 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ('"The basic measure of damages for the 
destruction of livestock is the animal's market value·, determined by replacement cost, with an 
appropriate reduction for any salvage valuen' (quoting Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div., Cont'l Grain 
Co., 447 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989))). 
203'. State v. Morison, 365 P.2d 266, 272 (Colo. 1961) (remanding for a new trial on damages 
and finding that the plaintiffs were "entitled to a sum equal to the difference between the fair 
market value of the herd before it contracted, paratuberculosis and its fair market value after it 
became infected with the disease"). 
204. See Kenny v. Lesser, 722 N.Y.S.2d 302, 305~6 (App. Div. 2001) (reviewing evidence 
that was utilized to show a race horse.' s value, including an offer to purchase the horse, and 
declining to interfere with the fact finding function of the jury, which awarded $100,000 for the 
death of the horse in a veterinary malpractice action); Collins, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at 
*5. 
205. McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. C.l. 
1994) (discussing the damages for the paralysis of a dog that subsequently was euthanized). 
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conditions where they are reasonably certain to occur or exist in the 
future," such as potential earnings, can be awarded.206 In the context of 
animals, a common type of future earnings would be the breeding 
services to be provided by such animals.207 It is relatively 
straightforward to determine the damages for the loss of a food 
producing animal, as there is a market for such animals.208 For food 
producing animals, damages have been claimed for lost income from 
the production of products from the animals.209 
Notwithstanding the clear precedent that values animals under a fair 
market value standard, several courts have utilized more flexible 
standards in determining value though continuing to reference market 
value as the usual standard. As one court stated, "[m]arket value is ... 
a standard not a shackle."210 Other examples of the use of different 
valuations include cases in which market value cannot be obtained 
easily or feasibly.211 An example of this more flexible standard is the 
case of McDonald v. Ohio State University Veterinary Hospital, in 
which a highly trained and pedigreed German shepherd suffered 
paralysis after surgery.212 The court considered several factors in 
determining the value of the dog, including specialized training, awards, 
and titles, as well as the stud services of the dog.213 Expert testimony in 
206. /d. (discussing potential earnings for a pedigreed Gennan shepherd). 
207. /d. (discussing stud fees for a pedigreed Gern1an shepherd). 
208. Bekkemo v. Erickson, 242 N.W. 617, 617-18 (Minn. 1932) (setting a market value for 
spring pigs, sows, and fall pigs and reiterating the standard used by the trial court that "the 
measure of damages ... is the reasonable market value of those hogs which you are reasonably 
certain would have been saved if the defendant had exercised that required degree of care, skill, 
and diligence"). The Bekkemo court also noted that "such damages as here involved can never be 
deternlined with absolute accuracy or mathematical certainty." /d. at 618. 
209. See State v. Morison, 365 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1961) (setting forth the damages 
requested for the loss of a dairy herd from disease allegedly caused by veterinary negligence, 
including lost income and the use of dairy products and beet). The court in this case cautioned 
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for losses that occurred after the cattle were sold, 
or in this case compensation for the loss of the progeny of the sold cattle, as should be reflected in 
the fair market value of the animal itself. /d. at 272-73. The plaintiffs were eligible to receive 
damages based on the diminution in market value, and allowance of the additional items was 
considered a fonn of double recovery. /d.; see also Collins, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at *5 
(discussing the market value of a steer that died after a dehorning procedure and stating that the 
potential meat value ranged from $300 to $500). 
210. McDonald, 644 N.E.2d at 752 (discussing damages for the paralysis of a dog that 
subsequently was euthanized). 
21 L /d. (providing an example of a case that adopted a flexible quality standard instead of 
using a market value approach to detennine the damages for the loss of an animal). 
212. /d. at 751-52 (discussing damages in a case where the defendant filed a stipulation of 
liability admitting that the surgery on the dog was negligent). 
213. /d. at 752 (awarding damages of $5000 for the loss of the dog itself and potential 
earnings from stud fees). 
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McDonald placed the dog's .value between $0 and $10,000.214 
Although the court began its analysis with market value, it referenced 
the time used to train the dog, as well as the efforts of McDonald to 
rehabilitate the paralyzed animal, and awarded $5000 in damages for 
the loss of the dog.215 
Courts will also use alternative valuations if market value is "not 
available or not accurate."216 For example, in Hohenstein v. Dodds, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that diseased pigs have no market 
value.217 The Hohenstein court set as the proper measure of damages 
the following: "the difference between the value of the pigs as they 
were on the date of the defendant's call, if they were to receive proper 
treatment, and the value of those which survived defendant's 
treatment. "218 
Occasionally plaintiffs demand damages consisting of the veterinary 
expenses incurred because of the tortious conduct.219 Statutory 
provisions in some states provide for veterinary expenses to be used to 
support damage awards. As an example, a Maryland statute provides 
that the measure of damages in the tortious injury or death of an animal 
(specifically a pet) is "the market value of the pet before the injury or 
death or the reasonable cost of veterinary care, but not more than $5000 
if such charge is greater."220 Often the application of these statutes is 
limited to service animals and the stated purpose is intended only to 
provide restitution to the disabled persons being assisted by such 
214. /d. 
215. /d. This court, although applying a "more elastic standard," reiterated that 
"[s]entimentality is not a proper element in the detennination of damages caused to animals." /d. 
216. Hohenstein v. Dodds, 10 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn. 1943). The court also stated that 
market value uis not the only measure of value." /d. 
217. /d. (finding that Minnesota law prohibits the selling of animals with infectious or 
contagious diseases, and that as a result, the pigs had no market value in their diseased condition). 
218. /d. 
219. Mathew v. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (App. Tenn. 1998) (affiuning a modified 
judgment consisting of the amount paid to a veterinarian for treatment where a court later found 
that the veterinarian committed malpractice in such treatment); Bowles v. Singh, No. CA99-10-
094, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3410, at *3, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. July 31, 2000) (affinning a damage 
award that included veterinary expenses in a veterinary malpractice case). Note that there were 
several procedural problems with the veterinarian-defendant's assignments of error in Bowles; 
thus, the trial court's presumption of an evidentiary basis for the damages award was affirmed. 
Bowles, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3410, at *8-*9. The court in Klinger declined to allow recovery 
for a necropsy to detennine the cause of death and found that market value could have been used; 
however, plaintiff did not introduce any evidence of the dog's value. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 
550. But see Stettner v. Graubard, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684-85 (Harrison, N.Y. Town Ct. 1975) 
(limiting the damages in a veterinary malpractice case to the animal's market value, despite the 
fact that the veterinary costs were higher than such market value). 
220. Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-llO(b) (2002). 
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animals.221 The availability of this type of damage to a plaintiff in a 
malpractice action will depend on the language of the statute, as it is not 
uncommon that such acts exclude from coverage claims against 
veterinarians. 222 
B. Non-economic Damages 
1. Emotional Distress (Intentional/Negligent) 
In addition to damages based on the loss of an animal as personal 
property, another claim often raised in connection with veterinary 
malpractice is the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress on the client.223 As there is growing literature discussing the 
bond between people and their animal companions, as well as greater 
acknowledgement that the deaths of these animals have a significant 
impact on people, it is not surprising that people are raising claims for 
emotional distress relating to the injury or death of animals on a regular 
basis.224 
The ability to recover damages for emotional distress depends on 
widely varying state laws. Some states have allowed claims based on 
damage to property, while others have held that the destruction of 
property will not support claims of emotional distress.225 States also 
221. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE. §§ 600.2, 600.5 (West 1999) (providing restftution in the 
amount of the veterinary bills and replacement cost of the assistance dog if the dog is disabled or 
killed either by a person or another dog); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 13/10 (2002) {allowing economic 
and non-economic recovery where economic damages include but are not limited to veterinary, 
retraining, and replacement costs); N.Y. GEN OBLIG. LAW§ 11-107 (McKinney 2001) (providing 
for damages consisting of veterinary costs, retraining or replacement costs, and lost wages or 
damages due to the loss of mobility incurred while retraining or replacement takes place); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 346.687 (2001) (allowing economic damages including temporary replacement 
services, veterinary expenses, and any other cost and expense incurred as a result of the theft of or 
injury to the animal); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-20-102 (2002) (providing for damages that included 
veterinary expenses, replacement services, and costs incurred in recovering the assistance 
animal). 
222. See infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that allow non-
economic damages for the death or fatal injury of a domesticated dog or cat but may exclude 
veterinarians (in actions for professional negligence) from their coverage). 
223. A person who proximately causes harm is required to pay for damages regardless of the 
nature of such damages under tort law. Squires-Lee, supra note 118, at 1062. This includes 
damages for emotional distress even though these types of damages are more difficult to quantify. 
/d. 
224. See Huss, Co,npanion Animal Issues, supra note 7., at 211-12 (discussing the greater 
attention and awareness given by courts to the grief process that people with companion animals 
may experience when their companion animals die). 
225. Compare Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 106~71 (Haw. 1981) 
(allowing distress claims based on harm to property), with Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 
891-92 (Neb. 1999) (finding that Nebraska law does not allow recovery for emotional damages 
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create distinctions based on whether the conduct alleged is intentional 
or negligent. Conduct usually must be extreme and outrageous in order 
to support claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.226 In 
order to recover under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, plaintiffs in some states must be close relatives of the victim or 
have been in fear of physical harm because of the conduct.227 Recovery 
for the negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress may also 
be limited to those cases where the person alleging the distress is a 
witness to the tortious conduct or is on the scene immediately after the 
injury occurs.228 
Courts have generally been reluctant to allow claims of emotional 
distress based on the injury or death of animals.229 It is not uncommon 
resulting from the negligent destruction of property and, more specifically, holding that "damages 
for mental suffering or emotional distress may not be recovered for the negligently inflicted death 
of an animal"), and Strawser v. Wright, 610 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that 
Ohio law does not permit recovery for emotional distress caused by the negligent injury or 
destruction of property). One argument that has been raised to attempt to circumvent the 
restrictions on recovering damages for the loss of personal property is the theory of "constitutive 
property." See Lockett v. Hill, 51 P.3d 5, 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). Constitutive property is based 
on the theory that "ownership or possession of certain personal property, like a pet, can become a 
central aspect of the owner's sense of identity." /d. 
226. See Carroll v. Rock, 469 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the level of 
conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a 
veterinarian when a client's cat escaped while under the veterinarian's care); see also Katsaris v. 
Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 536--38 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussing the test of extreme and outrageous 
conduct in a case in which two dogs were shot and remanding to deternune if post-shooting 
conduct supported the claim); Harasymiv v. Veterinary Surgical Assocs., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 9056, at * 10-* 11 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003) (concluding that conduct by a 
veterinarian sued for malpractice was not extreme, shocking or despicable and that "no 
reasonable juror could find that defendants' conduct as alleged 'exceeded all bounds usually 
tolerated by a decent society"' (citation omitted)). The Katsaris case had a strong dissenting 
opinion interpreting the statute that provided immunity from the killing of animals harassing 
livestock. Katsaris, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 534 n.2; id. at 538 (Sabraw, J ., dissenting). "Not only is 
[the dog] more than property today, he is the subject of sonnets, the object of song, the symbol of 
loyalty. Indeed, he is man's best friend." Id. at 538 (Sabraw, J., dissenting). 
227. See Langford v. Emergency Pet Clinic, 644 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) 
(providing that a plaintiff must be a bystander to an accident or be in fear of physical hann to 
present a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in a case relating to a dog's improper 
burial); Rowbotham v. Maher, 658 A.2d 912, 913 (R.I. 1995) (finding that a third party may only 
recover if he or she is a close relative of the victim and, because the victim was a dog, finding that 
the dog was not considered a relative). 
228. See Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (applying the 
general rules relating to emotional distress recovery and precluding any recovery for emotional 
distress suffered by the owners of sheep that were allegedly killed by neighbors' dogs). The 
Krasnecky court specifically found that it was not required to consider whether the class of 
persons included within emotional distress coverage included companion animals. /d. at 1288-
89. 
229. Huss, Co1npanion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 93-97 (discussing emotional distress 
claims relating to the loss of companion animals generally, regardless of the circumstance); see 
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for courts to strike claims for such damages.230 There have been a few 
cases where courts have allowed for the possibility of emotional distress 
also Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that where a dog was 
dismembered by another dog, "[ d]amages are not recoverable for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress from witnessing injury to property"); Coston v. Reardon, No. 63892, 2001 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 3188, at *9-*'11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2001) (finding the requirement that one be 
closely related to the injury victim in order to establish emotional distress would not be fulfilled 
by the relationship to the animal and noting that Connecticut does not allow recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from injury to property); Krasnecky, 777 
N .E.2d at 1288-89 (utilizing existing temporal and spatial proximity requirements in 
Massachusetts law to not allow claims of emotional distress for the death of seven sheep that the 
plaintiffs considered companion animals and declining to consider the expansion of the class of 
persons allowed to recover for emotional distress to companion animals); Rabideau v. Racine, 
627 N.W.2d 795, 802, 806 (Wis. 2001) (holding that negligent damage to property cannot be used 
to maintain a claim for emotional distress, though recognizing that the argument was made in 
good faith for an extension of existing law and was not frivolous). In addition, there have been 
several cases raising this issue in New York. New York courts have consistently found that New 
York laws do not pernlit recovery for mental suffering and emotional distress in connection with 
the loss of an animal. See Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, 844 F. Supp. 151, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(providing an example in a case in which a dog died, alleged1y due to the negligence of an 
airline); Johnson v. Douglas, 734 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 2001) (affirming a dismissal of a 
claim for emotional distress resulting front the loss of a pet by only stating "[i]t is well 
established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused 
by the negligent killing of a dog"); Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (App. Div. 1995) ("It is 
well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress 
caused by the negligent destruction of a dog."); Young v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 
390, 391 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress for 
loss of property). 
Some confusion has arisen from a finding in an often cited and criticized New York case in 
. . 
which an owner of a poodle who had made elaborate arrangements for the burial of her dog 
instead found remains of a dead cat in the casket and succeeded on her claim. Corso v. Crawford 
Dog & Cat Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (finding plaintiff was entitled to 
damages beyond the market value of the dog to compensate for "shock, mental anguish, and 
despondency"). But see Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. at 158 (criticizing the Corso case). The Corso 
court found that losing the right to memorialize a pet dog (versus a pet rock or losing a family 
photo album) would be actionable. Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The court distinguished 
between inanimate objects and pets that return love and affection, respond to human stimulation, 
and have brains capable of displaying emotion, causing a human response. /d. The court held 
that "a pet. is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a 
piece of personal property." /d. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to damages 
beyond the market value of the dog from due to the "shock, mental anguish, and despondency" 
caused by the wrongful destruction and loss of the dog's body. /d. Although sometimes this case 
is cited to support claims of emotional distress, the New York coun treated the mental anguish 
suffered by the plaintiff as merely a component of the damages from the wrongful destruction and 
loss of the dog's body, not as a separate claim of emotional distress. ld.; see also Brown v. 
Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing a distinction in 
Pennsylvania law between claims of emotional distress based on behavior toward animals and 
claims based on behavior that is focused on humans). 
230. E.g., State v. Morison; 365 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1961) (reporting that the trial court 
struck a claim for damages in the amount of $25,000 based on the plaintiffs suffering "great 
distress and anguish of mind, and loss of time and effort''); Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A. 2d 
1142, 1143-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (setting forth arguments for and against allowing 
emotional distress damages for the loss of pets in a negligence action against a groomer and 
• 
• 
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damages in the event of injury or death to animals but have found that 
the conduct at issue did not meet the standard.231 The courts in these 
cases generally have been able to find that existing state law supports 
the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of property. 232 
finding that allowing such damages would "proceed upon a course that had no just stopping 
point"). 
231. A Kentucky court of appeals found that punitive damages for claims based on intentional 
infliction of emotional distress would not be precluded simply because the underlying facts 
involved an animal. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812-13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
a case involving the sale of horses for slaughter supported a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress). The facts supporting this claim included repeated lying on the part of the 
defendants as to the status of the horses. /d. at 810. In another case, the Verntont Supreme Court 
indicated that a future case seeking recovery for emotional distress resulting from the negligent 
handling of an impounded animal could be successful. Lamare v. N. Country Animal League, 
743 A.2d 598, 605 (Vt. 1999) ("[T]his is not to say that a future case seeking recovery for the 
emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded 
animal a claim not alleged here would be unsuccessful."). The !Amare case can be 
distinguished from many of the other cases discussed in this section because no injury was 
inflicted on the animal. /d. at 599-600. In La1nare, a dog was allowed to be adopted even though 
an owner had been identified and had taken measures to reclaim the dog. /d. at 599--600. 
North Dakota's Supreme Court has analyzed the conduct of police officers who shot and killed 
five dogs in a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kautzman v. McDonald, 621 
N.W.2d 871, 876-77 (N.D. 2001). The Kautzman court found that the actions of the officers 
were not within the parameters of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress but 
reinstated the negligence claim based on the status of the animals. /d. at 877-80. Similarly, the 
Alaska Supreme Court stated that it was "willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an 
appropriate case." Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985). 
The Alaska Supreme Court reaffirnted its willingness to support a claim of emotional distress for 
the loss of a pet in 2001. Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311-12 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing 
a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress for the killing of a pet animal 
but finding that the facts of the case did not support this claim). For an Idaho court decision 
addressing claims of emotional distress stemming from animal loss, see Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 
1276, 1277-78 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a lower court erred in striking the Gill's claim 
for damages caused by mental anguish for the alleged killing of a pet donkey). 
232. For examples of non-malpractice cases discussing emotional distress claims for the 
injury or death of the animal, see Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067 
(Haw. 1981) (discussing the negligence of the Animal Quarantine Station where dogs were left in 
a hot van for at least an hour causing one dog to die of heat prostration), and see also McAdams v. 
Faulk, No. CAOI-1350, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *13-*14 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) 
(reversing a trial court's dismissal of a complaint against a veterinarian for negligence and 
malpractice and stating that "damages on a negligence claim are not limited economic loss 
damages, and inc1ude compensation for mental anguish"), and Johnson v. Wander, 592 So. 2d 
1225, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that a dog owner's claim for mental pain and 
suffering presented a question for the jury in a case where a veterinarian allegedly left a dog on a 
heating pad for a long period of time resulting in serious bums to the animal). But see Koester v. 
VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (expressing sympathy for the 
plaintiffs position regarding emotional distress but deferring to the legislature to create such a 
remedy); Soto v. United States, No. 1:01-CV-117, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10743, *6-*8 (W.O. 
Mich. July 23, 2001) (citing to the Koester case to find that Michigan does not allow for recovery 
of emotional distress damages resulting from the loss of a pet). In Campbell, the damages for the 
loss of the dog totaled $1000. Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1067. Hawaii had previously allowed 
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As the claim of veterinary malpractice usually is based on a theory of 
negligence, it is not surprising that it is difficult to find cases that have 
facts supporting the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
case of Miller v. Peraino illustrates one court's view of the use of the 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case involving 
the relationship between a client and a veterinarian.233 The clients 
brought their dog Nera to the veterinarian for oral surgery.234 The 
veterinarian told the clients that Nera had died of a heart attack but 
employees of the veterinarian reported that Nera died after the 
veterinarian had kicked and beaten the dog with a pole.235 After the 
for1ner employees and the clients began picketing the veterinary 
hospital, the veterinarian sued all of them for defamation, intentional 
interference with a business and contractual relationship, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.236 The clients 
counterclaimed with allegations, among others, of the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress resulting from the conduct that led to 
Nera's death.237 The Miller court distinguished between the 
veterinarian's actions towards the dog and other conduct that would 
support the claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress.238 
Essentially, conduct that is directed toward the dog does not support a 
cause of action.239 The court found that recovery for conduct directed 
toward third parties is limited to members of a person's immediate 
family present at the time, or other persons if the distress results in 
bodily harm.240 The Miller court cited to Pennsylvania statutory 
language stating that dogs are considered to be personal property and 
cannot be considered persons or family members.241 
claims of emotional distress for the negligent or intentional infliction of damage to personal 
property and did not require that the plaintiffs have actually witnessed the tortious event in order 
to recover damages. /d. at 1069, 1071. Hawaii was the first jurisdiction to allow recovery for 
mental distress without a showing of physically manifested hann. /d. 
233. Miller v. Peraino, .626 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
234. Jd. at 638. 
235. /d. 
236. /d. 
237. /d. at 639-40. 
238. /d. at 640. 
239. /d. The Miller court cited to an earlier Pennsylvania case alleging the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress arising from the death of a dog, Da.ughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 
864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). The Miller case is discussed in greater length in this Article because 
the Daughen court focused more on the viability of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress itself, rather than the possible facts that could support such a tort. 
240. Miller, 626 A.2d at 640. 
241. /d. 
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Conversely, it might be possible to sustain a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress based on the v.eterinarian's conduct 
toward clients.242 As the Miller court stated, the defendant's conduct 
must be extreme and outrageous: 243 
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent 
which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict 
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 
malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to 
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only 
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. 244 
In the Miller case, the veterinarian allegedly made statements such as 
"Nice truck, soon I'll own it" while writing down the truck's license 
plate number, and that Nera was ''fat and ugly like Mrs. Peraino.'-'245 
The veterinarian also ''asked whether the Perainos had made a rug out 
of Nera" and had "placed the Perainos' phone number on public phones 
with the notation that a good time could be had by calling 'Flo. '"246 
The Miller court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion 
by finding that these statements did not meet the standard for a 
successful claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.247 
. . 
An illustration of the way courts consider claims based on the 
negligent actions of a veterinarian is Robin v. Sammarco, in which a 
Pennsylvania district court discussed and dismissed a claim of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress in the case of a dog that died allegedly 
due to negligent post-operative treatment~248 In order to state a claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Pennsylvania, it is 
necessary to show that the plaintiff is a Hforeseeable plaintiff who 
suffered physical injury as a result of the defendant's negligence.''249 
The element of foreseeability is satisfied if "( 1) the plaintiff is a 
bystander who contemporaneously witnesses an accident in which a 
close family member is injured, or (2) the defendant owes the plaintiff a 
242. /d. 





248. Bobin v. Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *4, *8 (E.D. Pa. May 
17, 1995). 
249. /d. at *5. 
2004] Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice 523 
pre-existing contractual or fiduciary duty of care. "250 In order to meet 
this standard, the Bobins argued that the court 
should ( 1) regard domesticated dogs as "'persons' for the limited 
purposes of recognizing the intimate and familial relationship between 
[a dog] and its owner"; (2) expand the definition of "family" to 
include pets; and (3) recognize domesticated animals as a special 
category of personal property entitled to special legal status. 251 
The Bob in court declined to follow any of these theories.252 The Bobin 
court (like the Miller court) cited Pennsylvania statutory and case law 
supporting the proposition that dogs are personal property and not 
persons.253 The court next found that there was no controlling authority 
that would even suggest that Pennsylvania "would recognize the 
relationship between [pets and their owners] as the functional equivalent 
of an intimate familial relationship for this purpose."254 Finally, the 
court found that Pennsylvania does not regard pets as a unique form of 
personal property.255 Using this analysis, the district court predicted 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not recognize the cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the 
death of a dog and dismissed that count of the pleading.256 
Courts in Connecticut have also considered the applicability of 
emotional distress claims in a veterinary malpractice lawsuit.257 The 
court in George v. Leopold found that "bystander emotional distress 
should not be recognized as a basis for recovery in veterinarian 
malpractice."258 The George court considered the existing restrictions 
on the bystander emotional distress action and found that the cause of 
action would fail in several respects.259 Initially the court found that the 
relationship between the client and patient was not one of close 
relation.260 The court also stated "it is unlikely that a cat was 
contemplated in the court's contemplation of 'victim."'261 An earlier 
250. /d. at *5-*6. 
251. /d. at *6 (alteration in the original) (quoting plaintiffs' complaint). 
252. /d. at *7-*8. 
253. !d. at *7. 
254. /d. The court found that relevant Pennsylvania case law supported the contrary 
conclusion. /d. 
255. /d. at *8. 
256. /d. 
257. See generally George v. Leopold, No. 314997, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2859 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1996); Altieri v. Nanavati, 573 A.2d 359 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989). 
258. George, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2859, at *5. 
259. /d. at *7-*8. 
260. /d. at *4. 
261. /d. 
• 
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Connecticut case also considered the applicability of bystander 
emotional distress claims in the context of veterinary malpractice.262 
The court in Altieri v. Nanavati considered the likelihood that the claim 
would be available given that the Connecticut Supreme Court had held 
previously that there could be no bystander emotional distress claim 
arising out of a case of medical malpractice on another person.263 The 
Altieri court stated that there "is no reason to believe that malpractice on 
the family pet will receive higher protection than malpractice on a child 
or spouse. "264 
2. Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are awarded to "punish or deter willful, wanton or 
malicious misconduct";265 they are imposed to punish defendants for 
262. Altieri, 573 A.2d at 361. 
263. /d.; cf Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. App. 1997). In Zeid, the court noted 
"that the Texas Supreme Court has held that one may not recover damages for bystander recovery 
for mental anguish in medical malpractice cases. . . . We see no reason why the same rule would 
not apply in cases involving death due to veterinary malpractice." /d. at 370 (citations omitted). 
264. Altieri, 573 A.2d at 361. Another example is a 1996 Iowa Supreme Court case in which 
the court refused to allow the owners of a dog that was injured during the dog's stay at a boarding 
kennel to recover damages for mental distress based on sentimental attachment to the dog or 
damages for replacement cost or for the pet's special value. Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 
N.W.2d 689, 690-92 (Iowa 1996). The injured dog was a toy poodle that had had her left front 
leg and shoulder blade tom off by the kennel owner's dog. /d. at 690. Although the Iowa 
Supreme Court recognized that there had been some cases in which damages for mental distress 
had been allowed in actions based on the killing of a dog, the court found that Iowa law would 
not support such a claim. /d. at 691. As with some other states, Iowa law required that a plaintiff 
"must actually witness a tortious event in order to recover damages for emotional distress" and 
that, furthermore, there must be a close relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. /d. The 
law requires that "the plaintiff and victim [be] husband and wife or [be] related to within the 
second degree of consanguinity or affinity." /d. As much as a beloved pet may be considered a 
member of the family, the court found that under the law, the animal would not fall within this 
definition. /d. The court decided to follow the majority of jurisdictions that did not allow the 
recovery of damages for this type of mental distress. /d. The Iowa Supreme Court also held that 
the intrinsic value of the dog would not be considered in awarding damages for injuries to the 
dog. /d. at 692. Not only did the court state that there was no evidence that the dog had a special 
purpose, the court also noted that the Nichols still enjoyed the companionship of their pet (with 
the market value of a three-legged dog and four-legged dog being the same). /d. at 690, 692. The 
Iowa Supreme Court had previously recognized the intrinsic value of trees if the trees were 
standing for a special purpose, such as sentimental and historic reasons, maintained for shade and 
windbreaks, or for environmental, wildlife and special landmark purposes. /d. at 692. The court 
cited to an Iowa code provision that allowed for treble damages for the willful injury of trees, the 
lack of such a statute covering dogs, and the lack of evidence that the dog had a special purpose 
or intrinsic value, and held that intrinsic value should not be used to measure damages in the case. 
/d. at 692; cf Fredeen v. Stride, 525 P.2d 166, 168 (Or. 1974) (providing that conversion does not 
ordinarily "cause the property owner sufficient mental anguish" for pain and suffering, but that 
mental distress may be considered "as an element of the damages"). 
265. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.205(10) (West 2000) (defining punitive damages in medical 
malpractice cases). 
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wrongdoing that is considered extreme and to "deter others from 
engaging in similar conduct."266 Punitive damages have long been 
available for the, malicious killing of another person's animal.267 There 
have been relatively few cases that illustrate the availability of punitive 
damages in veterinary malpractice cases.268 An example is the Carroll 
v. Rock case, in which a client sued for the loss of her cat. 269 The 
Carroll court articulated the test for recovery of vindictive or punitive 
damages as "when a defendant acts .maliciously, willfully, or with a 
wanton disregard of the rights of others .. "270 Other cases have 
established that punitive damages are supported where the conduct is 
grossly negligent, malicious, willful or wanton, or there has been a 
266. Peck, supra note 113, at 409-10 (discussing punitive damages in tort l+tw and stating that 
punitive damages were "well-established as part of the common law well before the American 
Revolution"). 
267. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETII R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 666 (4th ed. 2000); 
see also Mitchell v. Henrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311 (Alaska 2001) (discussing the type of offensive 
conduct that would support punitive damages); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150-
51 (Minn. 1980) (finding that punitive damages were appropriate in, a case against an animal 
warden who had intentionally killed a cat in violation of an ordinance and statute, although the 
jury verdict of $2000 in punitive damages was reduced to $500); Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 
553 N.W.2d 424, 426, 428-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the availability of punitive 
damages in a personal property action in which sixty-five heifers were converted and punitive 
damages in the amount of $400,000 were awarded by the jury); Propes v. Griffith, 25 S.W.3d 
544, 547, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding an award of $2000 in actual damages and 
$4000 in punitive damages for the euthanization of two dogs by a person who was untruthful 
about her ownership of the dogs and committed other malicious, willful, and intentional conduct). 
268. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 267, at 666 (citing to Aorida cases that have allowed 
punitive damages in veterinary malpractice cases); e.g., Johnson v. Wander, 592 So. 2d 1225, 
1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a dog owner may be able to support punitive 
damages for emotional distress suffered as a result of a veterinarian's negligence); Knowles 
Animal Hosp. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that an animal 
hospital's neglect of a dog which resulted in injury was sufficient to support a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs); see also McAdams v. Faulk, No. CAOl-1350, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at 
*13~*14 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (reversing a trial court's dismissal of a complaint against 
a veterinarian for negligence and malpractice and noting that "punitive damages are recoverable 
on a malpractice claim"). 
269. Carroll v. Rock, 469 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). This case was not one of 
malpractice but was based on the theory of conversion or breach of bailment and emotional 
distress. /d. The client took her two cats to a veterinary clinic for surgery, and one of the cats 
escaped from the clinic. /d. at 392-93. The cat was never recovered. /d. at 392. 
270. ld. at 393. The Carrol/ court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on 
punitive and vindictive damages but stated that such instruction was uinconsequential because no 
punitive damages were awarded." ld. The Carroll court continued and found that award of 
damages for mental distress that does not accompany physical or pecuniary loss is allowed only if 
the conduct met the same standard required for outrageous or egregious conduct. /d. at 393-94. 
The court found that the conduct in the case did "not rise to the level of outrageousness and 
egregiousness required to support recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress." /d. at 
394. 
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reckless disregard of an owner's rights.271 As with claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, if the core of the action is based on the 
negligent actions of a veterinarian, it appears unlikely that the tortious 
conduct would rise to the level necessary to support punitive 
damages.272 
3. Loss of Companionship 
An additional possible claim relating to the loss of an animal is loss 
of companionship, which is similar to claims based on a human's loss of 
consortium.273 As loss of consortium claims have developed over the 
years, so has the argument that a loss of companionship claim based on 
the death of a companion animal may be viable.274 
Courts originally limited loss of consortium claims to the material 
services that a wife provided in the home.275 A more sentimental 
concept later developed that considered a spouse's loss of affection and 
companionship.276 Finally, parents' claims relating to the loss of a child 
were allowed, and several states have recognized a child's-claim for the 
loss of parental consortium.277 
Surveys show that many companion animals are treated as if they are 
family members.278 Studies examinin_g the nature of the relationship 
between humans and companion animals demonstrate that there is a 
271. SCHLUETER & REDDEN; supra note 267, at 666; see also Knowles Ani!Ml Hosp., 360 So. 
2d at 38 (affirming a jury award totaling $13,000 for the death of a dog that had been severely 
burned because a veterinary hospital had left the dog on a heating pad for more than a day and 
holding the injury "suffered by the dog to have been of a character amounting to great 
indifference to the property of the plaintiffs"). 
272. See generally infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text (discussing possible limitations 
and restrictions on punitive damages). 
273. See infra notes 323-43 and accompanying text (discussing analogy to wrongful death 
claims). 
274. Waisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 47. 
275. /d. 
276. /d. Some courts treat these material and sentimental aspects of consortium indivisibly. 
/d. 
277. /d. at 47, 50. The claim of loss of consortium was originally supported by the injury of a 
spouse or parent, but there are wrongful death statutes that may allow recovery on the same 
grounds. /d. at 48. Note that wrongful death claims are often restricted by state statute. One 
example is the various Indiana code provisions covering wrongful death claims where the-
decedent is not married and does not have dependent children, or where the decedent is a child. 
Tammy J. Meyer&, Kyle A. Lansberry, Tort lAw: Recent Developments in Indiana Tort Law, 34 
IND. L. REV. 1075, 1075-80 (2001). 
278. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the familial relationships, 
between humans and their animal companions). Seventy percent of dog owners and sixty-two 
percent of cat owners consider their companion animals to be like children or family members. 
AM. PET PRODS. MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 5, at xxxiv (reporting data from 2002). 
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sig_nificant impact on humans who share their lives with a companion 
animal.279 This is not an argument that companion animals should be 
treated as if they are human children or siblings, only that some 
companion animals take on roles similar to those of people. Certainly 
the issue of proving the relationship is one that would need to be 
addressed to determine whether damages for loss of companionship are 
appropriate. Clearly, one can make a distinction between animals that 
are treated as members of the family, in that they live in the home and 
receive the best veterinary care- that can be provided, and animals that 
have little contact with human family members.280 
A few cases have held that loss of companionship can be one factor 
in calculating the actual value of an animal.281 On the other hand, 
several cases have held that separate claims for loss of companionship 
would not be allowed for the loss of an animal.282 
279. See generally COMPANION ANIMALS IN HUMAN HEALTH, supra note 2 (discussing a 
variety of studies done on the impact of companion animals in human health}; MELSON, supra 
note 3 (discussing the relationship between animals and children and the impact animal contact 
has on children). 
280. The same type of proof is necessary in any loss of consortium claim. See Elaine T. 
Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court 
and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 
ANIMAL L~ 215 (2003) (discussing valuation of animals and suggesting an "investment approach" 
to the valuation of animals); Susanne Cetrulo, A Practitioner's Analysis _of the Loss of Parental 
Consortium in Kentucky, 26 N. KY. L. REv. I, 13 (1999) (discussing factors considered in 
detennining the amount of damages for a loss of consortium claim by a child, including the 
child's relationship with the parent); Geordie Duckier, The Economic Value of Companion 
Animals~· A Legal and Anthropological Argum-ent for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199 (2002) 
(discussing the true economic value of animals and utilizing wrongful death case law criteria in 
his analysis). · 
281. .Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (affinning 
that the loss of companionship could be used as an elen1ent in detennining damages in a property 
damage case~ similar to the treatment of other items of sentimental value, such as heirlooms and 
photographs, but refusing to extend an independent cause of action for loss of companionship). 
282. ld. (declining to extend an independent cause of action for loss of companionship for the 
death of a dog allegedly due to veterinary malpractice); Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187-
88 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (declining to allow damages for loss of consortium and pointing to the 
lack of a familial relationship in this case, in which a dog was destroyed by a dog warden prior to 
the: expiration of a statutory seven-day waiting period); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 
1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (finding that the "absence of statutory authority precludes recovery 
on the plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims related to the death of the sheep" where seven sheep 
that were considered companion animals were allegedly killed by the defendants' dogs); 
Oberschlake v. Ve.terinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (stating 
that Ohio does not recognize non-economic damages for injuries to companion animals in a 
veterinary malpractice case); see also Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing a loss of companionship claim and distinguishing Brousseau v. 
Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1980), which had allowed a pefs 
companionship to be used as a factor .to assess a dog's actual value to an owner); Koester v. VCA 
Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to create an independent 
cause of action for loss of companionship); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
528 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 35 
C. Statutory Provisions 
Recently there have been proposals for several statutory provisions 
that would establish a right to sue for damages, including non-economic 
damages, for the death or injury of animals.283 Such statutes generally 
focus on domesticated companion animals.284 Proposals for these 
statutes commonly occur after cases involving the intentional killing of 
companion animals receive significant attention.285 However, a 
Tennessee statute, the first of its kind, specifically states that it does not 
apply to veterinarians in actions for professional negligence.286 But 
even if there is not a specific exclusion for veterinary malpractice 
claims, the language of the statute may preclude its use in such claims, 
as it is common that for the statutory provision to be applicable, the 
animal must be within the direct control or supervision of its owner or 
on the owner's premises.287 
• 
1988) (stating that "[u]nder no circumstances, under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be 
recovery for loss of companionship due to the death of an animal"). The Gluckman court also 
dismissed a cause of action for an animal's pain and suffering. Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. at 158 
(citing acknowledgment by Gluckman that "there is not a [sic] yet a cause of action recognized 
for the pain and suffering of an animal"). Note that a circuit court judge in Oregon recently ruled 
against a motion to dismiss all causes of action, including a claim for loss of companionship of an 
animal. Geordie L. Duckier & Dana M. Campbell, Nature of the Beast: Is Animal Law Nipping 
at Your Heels?, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 2001, at 15, 17 (discussing Brock v. Rowe, No. 
C002535CV (Wash. County Ct.), a case that eventually settled). 
283. Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing existing and 
proposed statutes relating to the injury or death of companion animals); see also 510 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (West Supp. 2003) (providing for damages in civil actions against persons 
who have acted in bad faith in seizing or impounding animals or have been convicted of certain 
felony animal welfare provisions); H.R. 1260, 64th Gen. Assem., 7th Sess . . (Colo. 2003) 
(proposing loss of companionship damages not to exceed $100,000 for harm resulting from 
cruelty to companion dogs and cats or from negligent veterinary practices). 
284. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000) (covering "domesticated dogs and cats nonnally 
maintained in or near the household of the owner"); see also Huss, Companion Animal Status, 
supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing the Tennessee act and other proposed statutes). 
285. E.g., N.Y. State Assembly, Bill Summary A04545 (n.d.) (providing a justification 
based on "two recently-publicized cases" for a proposed law that would allow recovery of non-
economic damages in the death or injury of a companion animal), available at 
http://www.assembly.state.ny.usneg/?bn=A04545 (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). 
286. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(e). 
287. See, e.g., A04545, 2003-2004 Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (amending the agricultural 
and markets law), available at http://www.assembly.state.ny.usneg/?bn=A04545&sh=t (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2004). 
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V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO DAMAGES AVAILABLE IN VETERINARY 
• 
MALPRACTICE CASES 
A. Should Non-economic Damages Be Available in Claims for the 
Injury or Loss of Companion Animals? 
An initial question is whether there should be a change from the 
current system that, with very few exceptions, does not provide non-
economic damages for the injury or death of an animal. 
Unquestionably, animals under the legal system are treated as just 
another form of personal property. Whether this is appropriate depends 
on one's view of the role of animals in today's society. It appears 
unlikely that there will be a sweeping change in the legal system in the 
near future to ensure that animals are no longer treated as personal 
property. 288 
The relationship between companion animals and the people who 
care for them has changed and continues to develop.289 There is now 
evidence that companion animals can have a significant positive impact 
on human health.290 There is a greater acknowledgment of the role that 
these animals play in the lives of their human family members.291 From 
another perspective, the value of these animals has changed. The 
financial investment in these animals can be considerable for many 
people.292 There is a greater interest in the welfare and protection of 
288. Perhaps an exception to this rule can be found in the treatment of great apes. There is an 
active coalition of organizations attempting to provide additional protection to the great apes-
chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans. One step in this process is providing that these 
animals have a special and unique status. Ways to accomplish this include considering them as 
beings and allocating rights to them. New Zealand has already taken this step. New Zealand's 
1999 Animal Welfare Act provides that non-human great apes will have individual fundamental 
rights. Animal Welfare Act, 1999 (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2004); see also Germany Enshrines Rights of Animals, TORONTO STAR, May 18, 2002, 
at A28 (discussing the New Zealand statute and noting that the rights include the right not to 
suffer cruel or degrading treatment and to participate only in the most benign experiments), 
available at 2002 WL 21219957. 
289. See Huss, Companion Animal Issues, supra note 7, at 188-95 (discussing the 
domestication of animals and the changing relationship between animals and humans). 
290. See generally COMPANION ANIMALS IN HUMAN HEALTI-1, supra note 2 (discussing 
studies that have been done on the impact .of companion animals on human health). 
;291. See MELSON, supra note 3, at 37-43 (discussing the impact pets have_ on children and 
families). 
292. Obviously the amount of money that some are willing and able to invest in these animals 
differs greatly. One animal may be given treatment for cancer, a kidney transplant, or multiple 
surgeries to repair damage to its knees while other animals are only given palliative treatment or 
are surrendered when the cost of their maintenance is considered too high. See Brody, supra note 
19 (discussing medical treatments available to companion animals); Draper, supra note 13 
(discussing laser surgery for animals). 
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these animals.293 The law should reflect the values of society. Clearly, 
for a considerable portion of the population, these animals have a 
greater economic value than that reflected by currently available 
damages.294 
The relationship between many people, and their animals is important 
and should be protected.295 The tort law goals of affirtning societal 
values through compensation are not being met under the current 
system.296 This matter is important to many people and the law, often 
deals with the issues that impact the quality of life for individuals. 
Several organizations have developed curricula with the goals of 
fostering respect for all living things and improving the treatment of 
animals at their core.297 Allowing non-economic damages for the loss 
of animals supports an argument that the value of all living creatures, 
including human beings, is increased.298 Recent studies link the abuse 
of animals with other violent acts.299 Providing more serious penalties 
for tortious acts against animals may allow for the recognition of an 
individual's potential for additional violence against humans.300 
Advocates of non-economic damages state that allowing such 
damages would force veterinarians to be more conscientious and raise 
the quality of veterinary care.301 The economic impact of permitting 
293. Eric Sundquist, Nonhuman Rights: Are Animals Ours To Eat, To Wear, To Experiment 
On?, ATLANTA J. & C.ONST., Aug. 25, 2002, at QI (discussing state protections for animals and 
stating that four laws making cruelty to animals a felony passed within the last year alone). 
294. One insurance brokerage company, ABD Insurance and Financial Services, is w.orking to 
educate its veterinarian clients about the impact of malpractice claims and the possibility of non-
economic damages becoming available. O'Brien, supra note 66~ Mr. O'Brien believes ihat it is 
just a matter of time before non-economic damages (in some forrit) will be available to plaintiffs 
in California. /d. 
295. Kathleen Burge, Appeals Court Weighs the Value of Family Pets, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
25, 2001, at B l (citing to Barbara Newell, an attorney with the Animal Legal Defense Fund, who 
stated that people have "real and familial relationships" with animals), available at 2001 WL 
396354. 
296. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 43 44 (setting forth the goals of the tort system and the. 
arguments made by proponents for allowing economic damages for emotional harm suffered by 
pet owners). "Owners' mental harm when a pet is wrongfully killed or injured is quite real, and 
failure to compensate allows unchecked and uncompensated wrongs." ld. at 47. 
297. MELSON, supra note 3, at 179-80; see also Lydia S. Antoncic, A New Era in Humane 
Education: How Troubling Youth Trends and a Call for Character Education Are Breathing New 
Life into Efforts To Educate Our Youth About the Value of AU Life, 9 ANIMAL L. 183 (2003) 
(discussing humane education and state laws supporting humane education). 
298. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 47-49. 
299. MELSON, supra note 3, at 167-81. 
300. /d. at 177-79 (discussing cross training and other activities related to the link between 
animal and child abuse). 
301. Willing, supra note 17 (citing to Robert Newman, an attorney who handles animal law 
cases, including lawsuits against veterinarians for malpractice). 
2004] Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice 531 
non-economic damages supports the tort goal of deterring future bad 
acts. In theory, allowing greater damage awards will force veterinarians 
who do not meet the standard of care out of practice. 
There is also a question of fairness. Veterinarians emphasize the 
importance of the human-animal bond and should not be able to then 
argue that the bond is irrelevant when it is time to determine damages in 
malpractice actions.302 Clients who are not bonded with their 
companion animals would certainly not seek the sophisticated and 
expensive treatments at the core of a growing number of veterinarian 
specialists' practices. As a result, a natural consequence of veterinary 
malpractice is emotional harm to the clients. 
Opponents of non-economic damages often begin by highlighting the 
economic impact such lawsuits would have on veterinarians and clients. 
They argue that allowing these types of damages would cause 
veterinarians to change their practices and to begin performing more 
defensive medicine.303 The cost of veterinary care will increase 
because veterinarians will order more expensive tests. 304 Veterinarians 
paying higher malpractice premiums will pass on that cost to their 
clients.305 The higher cost of veterinary care could price this treatment 
beyond some people's ability to pay and may increase the rate of 
euthanization of animals.306 The financial impact on veterinarians' 
practices could be significant, further eroding the relatively low salaries 
of these medical professionals.307 This financial pressure could cause 
veterinarians to leave the practice and could decrease interest in this 
field.308 
302. Waisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 70 (citing to a veterinary ethics text discussing the 
promotion of the human-companion bond). 
303. Burge, supra note 295 (citing to Richard Cupp, a law professor at Pepperdine 
University). 
304. /d. 
305. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 48; Willing, supra note 17 (citing to Victor Schwartz, 
counsel for the American Tort Refonn Association, who said that allowing these types of 
damages "encourages unnecessary lawsuits," and to Arthur Tennyson, an officer of the American 
Veterinary Medical Association, who said that "such suits will drive up the cost of vets' 
malpractice insurance"); see also O'Brien, supra note 66 (discussing the impact of higher awards 
on the cost of veterinary care). 
306. Burge, supra note 295 (citing to Richard Cupp, a law professor at Pepperdine 
University); see supra notes 110--14 and accompanying text (discussing some the arguments 
made by proponents of limitations on medical malpractice damages). 
307. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the average salary for 
veterinarians compared to other medical professionals). 
308. By analogy, consider the physicians who have ceased providing certain services because 
of the risk of significant judgments against them on malpractice grounds. See generally Stein, 
supra note 108 (discussing the impact of malpractice rates, including the closing of medical 
clinics and the elimination of high-risk procedures and practices). 
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Even if the economic benefits outweigh the costs, opponents of non-
economic damages point to philosophical arguments against equating 
animals to humans in this manner.309 One philosophical argument is 
that allowing non-economic damages for the loss of animals will 
corrode the traditional view that human life is sacred and more valuable 
than animallife.310 Wrongful death statutes articulate a restricted class 
of human beneficiaries. 311 Allowing non-economic damages for the 
loss of animals, makes it possible to argue that animals are being placed 
above humans who are not covered by such statutes, such as committed 
but unmarried partners or unadapted stepchildren. 
A practical issue to consider is the recent trend to limit non-economic 
damages. Non-economic damages are notoriously difficult to measure. 
What is significant pain and suffering that adversely impacts the quality 
of life for one person may not have the same effect on another.312 
There are .strong arguments on both sides of this issue. It is certainly 
possible that a statutory provision allowing for non-economic damages 
could cause insurance rates and veterinary costs to increase.313 
Uncertainty alone, especially in jurisdictions where there have been 
higher than expected judgments or settlements, could also lead to 
increased rates. An important public policy is to provide an atmosphere 
where veterinarians can provide services at reasonable prices to as large 
a number of animals as possible while supporting the general tort goals 
309. Burge, supra note 295 (citing to Richard Cupp, a law professor at Pepperdine University, 
who opposes awarding emotional damages to pet owners, stating that "[h)umans and animals are 
not the same ... and should not be treated the same by the law"). Professor Cupp set out both 
pragmatic and moral arguments against allowing emotional distress damages in a commentary 
published in 1998. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking Up the Wrong Tree Justice: Awarding 
Emotional Distress Damages to Pet Owners Whose Animals Are Harmed Is a Dog of an Idea, 
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at B5, available at 1998 WL 24395236. 
310. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 48. 
311. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. , PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 947 (5th ed. 1984). 
312. Note that this Article is not arguing that non-economic damages should be allocated for 
the pain and suffering of the animals themselves. Although scientific studies have shown that 
many species of animals have the capacity to feel pain in what appear to be ways similar to 
humans, the focus in this Article is the impact of veterinarian malpractice on clients. There is 
certainly room within the legal system to argue for allocation of damages for pain and suffering 
of animals (presumably with any damage award to be used for the care of an animal). See Huss, 
Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 101-02 (describing a proposed statute in 
Massachusetts that would provide for such pain and suffering damages). One animal rights 
activist argues that these pet cases are "worse than useless" because they reinforce the idea that 
"non-human animals exist for humans' benefit" and are about "humano-centric interests." 
Willing, supra note 17 (citing to Gary Francione, a Rutgers University law professor and author 
of several animal rights books that focus on animals' status as property). 
313. The cost of veterinary care has already increased with the utilization of specialists and 
lifestyle drugs. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing number 
of specialists and the types of veterinary treatment now available). 
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of compensation, deterrence, and affirtnance of societal values. 314 
Capping non-economic damages to a "reasonable" level would appear 
to limit the impact of such damages on insurance rates and the provision 
of veterinary services while allowing meritorious lawsuits. 
If such a change is going to be made, for what losses should non-
economic damages be available? Non-economic damages in medical 
malpractice cases are available to plaintiffs for pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental distress, physical impainnent, disfigurement, 
loss of capacity to enjoy life, loss of consortium, society and 
companionship, loss of love or affection, and other nonpecuniary 
damages.315 Similar damages could be applied to veterinary 
malpractice cases that impact clients. 
Another issue is whether malpractice relating to all species of animals 
should be covered. Historically, certain animals have been treated 
differently.316 The value of food producing animals appears to be 
adequately measured under the current system. These animals have 
always had economic value and such value usually can be determined 
through market forces. Unlike companion animals, the treatment of 
these animals does not cause great concern among the majority of the 
population.317 The availability of non-economic damages is premised 
314. See generally Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 48 (discussing the elastic demand for 
veterinary medicine). One response to the increasing cost of veterinary treatment is to allow for 
the provision of basic treatment by animal care and nonprofit humane societies. Often there are 
limitations on the care that these organizations can provide; however, Washington State recently 
passed statutory provisions, effective on July 1, 2003, that would allow these types of 
organizations to. provide electronic identification (microchipping), surgical sterilization, and 
vaccinations to low income households. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.92.260 (West Supp. 
2004). Sometimes services provided to low income animal owners are primarily intended to 
accomplish a public health or safely goal, such as the vaccination of animals to prevent rabies and 
the spaying or neutering of pets to deal with an overpopulation problem. See Claudia 
Kawczynska, Taking It to the Streets, BARK, Fall 2001, at 30 (describing a mobile veterinary 
clinic used in Los Angeles to provide spaying or neutering services to low income residents' 
pets). 
315. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3333.2 (West 1997) (discussing California's cap of $250,000 on non-
economic losses for medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2003) 
(providing for a cap of $300,000 for non-economic damages in tort cases against health care 
professionals); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.205(7) (West 2000) (defining non-economic damages); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-14.-11 (2002) (providing for limited liability of insureds under the 
state's medical malpractice insurance scheme of $500,000 per claim and $1 million per policy 
period); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003) (providing for a cap on 
general damages of $500,000 with no limitation on special damages in medical malpractice 
cases); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 893.55(4)(a) (West 1997) (defining non-economic damages). 
316. See Huss~ Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 84-88 (discussing existing 
distinctions based on an animal's species). 
317. If so, presumably there would be a significantly greater percentage of vegetarians in the 
population and more attention would be paid to factory farming. See generally MATfHEW 
SCULLY, DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS, AND THE CALL TO 
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on the type. of relationship that a person has with an animal. 
Presumably, most people involved in food production would not have 
this type of relationship with their food producing animals (although 
certainly they may feel very differently about their co·mpanion animals). 
Making distinctions based on animal species is quite common under 
current law, and there is no reason that such differences, based on the 
use and usual relationship people have· with their animals, cannot be 
continued under any new statutory provision.318 
Should general statutes relating to the death or injury of animals 
include veterinarians? There, are compelling arguments. on both sides of 
this issue. Those in favor of including veterinarians in a general statute 
argue that, especially in egregious cases, veterinarians should not 
receive protection from liability simply because of their profession. In 
fact, an argument can be made that veterinarians should be held to a 
higher standard of care because of the privilege the state grants them, in 
the form of a license to provide veterinary medical treatment for a fee. 
In addition, by bringing their companion animals to a veterinarian for 
treatment, clients have formed a relationship of trust with their 
veterinarian. The tort goal of deterrence of future bad acts applies 
equally to veterinarians and other wrongdoers. 
Opponents of including veterinarians in general statutes argue that 
veterinarians are already regulated under veterinary practice acts and by 
boards of veterinary medicine. One of the reasons for the general 
statutes is to provide a civil remedy against wrongdoers for the 
mistreatment of their animals. But, they argue, the common law has 
already provided such a remedy that of veterinary malpractice. In 
addition, there will likely be more suits against veterinarians than other 
wrongdoers simply because veterinarians are identifiable, unlike many 
perpetrators of violence against animals.319 Finally, from a rational 
political perspective, unless there are additional safeguards for 
veterinarians in a statute with general coverage, including veterinarians 
will likely create a considerable amount of opposition to such 
legislation. The best statutory language is irrelevant if the legislature 
cannot pass it. A separate provision relating to damages for veterinary 
MERCY (2002) (discussing, among other matters, factory farming); Pollan, supra note 1, at 58 
(discussing the industrialization of American animal farming and one response to it). 
318. See Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 84-88 (discussing distinctions 
among. animals). 
319. See, e:g., N.Y. State Assembly, Bill Summary A04545, supra note 285 (citing to two 
cases justifying the need for legislation and stating that neither perpetrator had been found). 
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malpractice would logically be included in the statutory sections 
relating to litigation actions. 320 
For these reasons, I recommend the adoption of a separate act relating 
to veterinary malpractice. Certainly, there should be other acts that 
relate to the injury or death of companion animals caused by non-
veterinarians, as many of the same justifications for adequate remedies 
apply in those situations.321 The distinction is that veterinarians, 
because of the importance of their role in providing health care to 
animals, should be afforded protections that are not warranted if a non-
veterinarian causes injury to or death of a companion animal.322 
B. Analogy to Wrongful Death Statutes and the Impact of Tort Reform 
The focus of this paper has been on the underlying action veterinary 
malpractice as the basis for suit. Because animals do not have standing 
to sue on their own behalf, it is necessary to allow their legal owners to 
sue. 323 This Article does not attempt to argue that animals should be 
able to sue on their own behalves rather, the goal of this Article is to 
show that the persons closest to the animal should have the right to sue 
based on the veterinary malpractice's impact on their lives.324 It is this 
impact on third parties that is analogous to existing wrongful death 
statutes. There are very few cases in which an animal is injured but 
recovers from its injuries, and the damages issues are complicated in 
such situations.325 Presumably, many of the damages would be the 
320. For example, under the current law of South Dakota, there is a specific provision 
providing for a three-year statute of limitations for actions against veterinarians for "malpractice, 
error, mistake, or failure to cure." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 15-2-14.5 (Michie 2001). The section 
does not prohibit any counterclaim as a defense to any action for services brought by a 
veterinarian. /d. 
321. See Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing current and 
proposed statutes that apply to non-veterinarian wrongdoers). 
322. Although other providers of services for companion animals, such as groomers and 
boarders, would also experience the impact of allowing non-economic damages, a general statute 
could cover these providers. 
323. Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 79-82 (discussing the issue of standing 
as it relates to animals). 
324. This does not mean that there are no strong arguments that a suit should not be allowed 
for the impact of the veterinary malpractice on the animals themselves. There are scientific 
studies supporting the ability of many animals (specifically mammals) to experience pain. There 
are commentators who argue that focusing the impact on humans reinforces the property status of 
animals. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW (ETHICS AND ACTION) 
( 1995). 
325. An example of this situation is an Iowa Supreme Court case that found that when a dog 
was injured but not killed, the market value of a three-legged dog and a four-legged dog was the 
same. Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690, 692 (Iowa 1996). The injured dog was 
a toy poodle that had had her left front leg and shoulder blade tom off by a kennel owner's dog. 
/d. at 690. 
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same if an animal survives, but from a practical perspective, many 
veterinary malpractice suits arise because an animal has died.326 
The right of survivors to bring suit for compensation for the death of 
a loved one is established by state statute in the United States.327 
Wrongful death statutes vary considerably by state.328 The statutes 
define the persons that may bring suit over the death.329 Historically, 
only spouses, parents, and children had the right to sue under a 
wrongful death statute.330 Other possible claimants include siblings. 
Obviously the relationships between veterinary clients and their animals 
do not fit within any of these categories, except by analogy. 331 
Wrongful death statutes may create a new cause of action or merely 
create a remedy to support an existing cause of action. 332 One example 
of this is the interaction between medical malpractice claims and 
wrongful death statutes. In some states, the interaction between 
statutory provisions dealing with medical malpractice and wrongful 
death statutes is clear, but in others, there is still some confusion over 
the rights of parties because of contradictions in the two statutes.333 
326. WILSON, supra note 14, at 119 (citing to sources at the California State Veterinary Board 
stating that "approximately 50-70% of all grievances are associated with the death of an animal"). 
The complication, of course, is that unlike medical care for humans, euthanasia is a common and 
accepted part of veterinary practice. The euthanasia of animals occurs both because of economic 
reasons and a desire to put animals out of their pain. See generally Sara A. Wiswall, Animal 
Euthanasia and Duties Owed to Animals, 30 MCGEORGE L. REv. 801 (1999) (describing new 
California legislation regulating euthanasia). Note that California has a policy against the 
euthanization of adoptable animals. See CAL. ClV. CODE§ 1834.4 (West Supp. 2004). 
327. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OR INJURY § 1:9 (3d 
ed. 1992). Speiser sets out the historical background of wrongful death statutes. /d. § 1 :8. 
328. /d. § 1.9 ("The provisions of the different American state death statutes vary widely."); 
see also id. § 1.13 (providing that "each of the 50 states has some statutory system under which 
damages may be awarded for wrongful death"). 
329 . . KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, at 947. 
330. /d. The ability of a person to sue for the death of an unborn fetus varies by state. Many 
times recovery is based on whether the fetus is viable at the time of the incident that caused the 
tennination of the pregnancy. Jill D. Washburn Helbring, To Recover or Not To Recover: A State 
by State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363 (1996) (discussing the 
ability to recover for the death of a fetus and dividing the analysis into various time periods 
relating to the status of the fetus). 
331. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (explaining that animals are often viewed as 
members of the family). There have been plaintiffs who have unsuccessfully argued that their 
companion animals should be treated as family members. See, e.g., Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 
555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996) (finding that as much as a beloved pet may be considered a 
member of the family, under Iowa law, the animal would not fall within the definition requiring 
that the plaintiff and victim be related to within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity). 
332. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 327, § § 1: 13-1 : 14. 
333. For example, a wrongful death statute may have a different statute of limitations than that 
of a medical malpractice statute. Jared R. Faerber, Recent Developments in Utah La~v, 1997 
UTAH L. REv. 1087, 1164 (stating that there are two competing standards in the United States 
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In addition to wrongful death statutes of general application, there are 
many state statutes that provide a remedy in the event of a death or 
injury in specific circumstances.334 The treatment of a specific 
profession or activity in a special manner for tort liability is not 
. . 
uncommon. Several recent tort reforms have had limited applicability, 
allowing legislatures to pass them.335 
The damages available under wrongful death statutes have evolved 
over time.336 The type of damage that is most analogous to the changes 
proposed in this Article is the ability to recover for the loss of 
companionship. Early interpretation of many statutes did not allow for 
the recovery of loss of companionship.337 Just as wrongful death 
statutes evolved to allow this type of damage, statutory provisions can 
be enacted to encompass the relationship between humans and their 
animal companions. 
One barrier to changing the current system is the simple fact that such 
a statutory provision will be seen as a type of tort reforn1. 338 Though 
there are several goals of tort reform,339 ideally, tort refortn should try 
to discourage the filing of frivolous claims while supporting valid 
governing which statute of limitations will control wrongful death actions arising from medical 
malpractice claims). 
334. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 327, § 1:9. There are also federal statutes that cover 
wrongful death in specific situations. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, at 945-46. 
335. Terry Carter, Piecemeal Tort Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at 50 (discussing incremeQtal 
tort reform measures passed by the U.S. Congress and the likelihood of additional tort reform 
targets); Andrew Harris, Federal Vaccine Act Shoots Down Suit, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at 
B 1 (discussing a recent case interpreting the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1992, 42 
U.S.C. § 300, that allows for automatic recovery for damages but requires plaintiffs to fulfill 
certain procedural requirements); John G. Salmon, Fifteen Years of Colorado Legislative Tort 
Reform: Where Are We Now?, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2001, at 5, 7-10 (discussing statutory 
provisions covering the tort liabiJity of special interests, such as dramshops, social hosts, firearms 
and ammunition manufacturers, ski areas, equine and llama activity sponsors, and baseball team 
owners). 
336. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 327, § 3:3. 
337. /d. § 3:36. Speiser points out that the distinction between loss of companionship 
damages and mental anguish damages is Ha fine one." /d. 
338. One difficulty will be to pa~s a statute that will withstand judicial scrutiny. See generally 
Bonanti, supra note 75 (viewing tort refonn as an effort to curb civil justice); William Glaberson, 
State Courts Sweeping Away Laws Curbing Suits for Injury, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1999, at AI 
(discussing the trend of judicial nullification of new liability laws), available at LEXIS, News 
Library, New York Times File; Stephen Labaton, Added Rush on Revising Tort System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at Cl (discussing federal legislation that in specific instances would cap 
attorneys fees and eliminate punitive damages), available at LEXIS, News Library, New York 
Times File; James D. Zirin, Roadblocks to Tort Reform Global Economy, FORBES, Jan. ll, 1999, 
at 80 (discussing tort reforms and state court nullification of many of the refonns), available at 
1999 WL 2046167. 
339. Scoggins, supra note 95, at 98.5-86. 
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litigation. 340 The goal should not be eliminating the ability to file 
claims against veterinarians. The judicial system can be a powerful 
force for change. If a veterinarian consistently practices below the 
standards set by the profession, the veterinarian should be encouraged, 
through the imposition of damage awards against him or her, to leave 
the profession. It is unlikely that every individual involved in such a 
system, whether a veterinarian or a client, will be happy with the 
system, but the goal should be that, as a whole, the system works best 
for th·e public at large. 
The difference in types of tort reform reveals that legislatures create 
rights at the same time they cap potential damages.341 Although the 
right to sue for veterinary malpractice exists, the extension of damages 
to encompass non-economic, damages would create a new remedy in 
most jurisdictions. 342 Based on the adoption and subsequent judicial 
treatment of other legislation, it appears that courts are likely to uphold 
the validity of any new veterinary malpractice scheme because of its 
limited scope. 343 
C. Proposed Changes in Damages Available in Veterinary 
Malpractice Cases 
1. Capped Non-economic Damages 
In most jurisdictions, statutory provisions must be passed in order to 
provide, for non-economic damages in veterinary malpractice. Similar 
to the statutory language in existing wrongful death statutes, the 
proposed provision should set out the parameters for damages and the 
beneficiaries of the statute.344 The core language for such a statutory 
provisio,n is set out in the Appendix to this Article.345 Any new 
statutory provision could encompass both economic and non-economic 
340. /d. at 985. 
341. This is especially clear in states, such as New York, with patterns of case law that have 
already established that non-economic damages are not available in situations where property has 
been destroyed., See s~Jpra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the courts 
did not allow non-economic damages for injuries to animals as the animals were considered 
property). Given the limited scope of this type of tort refonn, it may be more likely to withstand 
judicial scrutiny. See generally Carter, supra note 335 (discussing incremental tort reform 
measures passed by the U.S. Congress and the likelihood of additional tort reform targets). 
342. See supra notes 223-64 and accompanying text (discussing the ability to recover 
damages for emotional distress); supra notes 273-87 and accompanying text (discussing claims 
of loss of companionship relating to the injury or death of an animal). 
343. See generally DOBBS, supra note Ill, at 527. 
344. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, at 949-54 (discussing the types of damages provided for 
under wrongful death statutes). 
345. See infra app. 
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damages or could limit itself to establishing_ the ability to recover non-
economic damages alone. 346 Economic damages could expand from 
merely the loss of the animal itself347 to the recovery of veterinary 
fees,348 burial costs, court costs, and attorneys fees.349 Allowable non-
economic damages could include the loss of reasonably exp_ected 
society, companionship, and love and affection of an animaJ.350 It 
would also be appropriate for legislatures to clarify the circumstances, if 
any, in which emotional distress claims could be brought relating· to the 
injury or de_ath of an animal. 
In line with the general trend in tort reform, any non-economic 
damages allowed by statute should be subject to a cap.351 A cap of 
$25,000 on non-economic damages for the death of an animal is a 
reasonable goai.352 In some jurisdictions, proponents of legislation may 
need to alter the level of the cap to ensure the passage of the legislation. 
It is important to note that a cap serves as the outside limit of non-
economic damages. 'There may be relatively few cases in which non-
economic damages in any significant amount will even arise, given a 
particular community's attitude regarding the status of animals. It will 
be important to maintain a cap of a certain level in order to provide an 
incentive to bring only meritorious claims.353 
346. Id. (discussing the inclusion of .economic damages in wrongful death statutes and the 
trend toward allowing loss of consortium damages). ,. 
347. See generally supra notes 199-218 and accompanying text (discussing the valuation of 
killed or injured animals in malpractice cases). 
348. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing a Maryland statute that allows for 
lhe recovery of veterinary costs of up to $5000 for the tortious injury or death of a pet) ., 
349. Waisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 72 (setting forth a proposal for recovery of 
damages in the case of the death or injury of companion animals caused by a tortious act 
regardless of the circumstances). 
350. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000) (setting forth damages allowed by statute for the 
tortious killing of pets). 
351. Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0 I 0 (2002) (providing non-economic damages caps for 
personal injury and wrongf"tl death actions)~ The Alaska statutory provision uses a multiple of a 
person's life expectancy to detennine damages. ld. But see ARIZ. CONST. art. ll, § 31 (providing 
that there shall be no limitations on ''the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death 
or injury of any person"); id. art. XVIII, § 6 (providing that the ''right of action to recover 
damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to 
any statutory limitation"). 
352. Cf H.R. 03-1260, 64th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 2003) (proposing that damages for loss of 
companionship arising out of the death of animals from negligent veterinary practices be capped 
at $100,000). Compare this with the $250,000 limitation on non-economic loss or injury 
damages for the death of a human by negligence. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21..:203 (2003). 
353~ In addition, to reflect the changing economy, the legislature should increase any cap to 
reflect annual percentage changes in the _consumer price index. Cf. MICH~ COMP~ LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.1483(4) (West 1996) (providing an annual increase in the limitation of non-economic 
damages for medical malpractice cases); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 538.210 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) 
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If there is concern that a veterinarian liable for non-economic losses 
may suffer an unreasonable financial burden, one way to alleviate the 
problem is to provide that any damages for non-economic losses be 
payable over a period of time, at the veterinarian's option.354 The time 
can be set by statute, or such a statutory provision could provide a range 
of time depending on the value of the non-economic damages. The 
legislature would determine the public policy issue of whether such a 
time period would be necessary if the award is covered by insurance. 
2. Limited Punitive Damages 
It may be necessary to limit punitive damages or collapse non-
economic and punitive damages to,gether in order to enable the passage 
of statutory provisions for punitive damages. Punitive damages have 
come under criticism in recent years along with other non-economic 
damages.355 Although statistically punitive damages are assessed on a 
(setting a cap on non-economic damages at $350,000 per occurrence from any one defendant, 
with adjustments based on personal consumption expenditures); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44:-2825 
(1998 &_ Supp. 2003) (setting the total amount recoverable under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical 
Liability Act {optional for patients) to $1.25 million with health-care providers liable for no more 
than $200,000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 41A.031 (Michie Supp. 2003) (limiting non-economic 
damages in medical malpractice cases to $350,000 for each defendant with some exceptions, such 
as gross malpractice); WIS. STAT. ANN~- § 893.55(4)(d) (West 1997) (setting a cap of $350,000 
for non-economic damage.s, as adjusted to reflect change.s in the consumer price index). 
354. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-203 (2003) (providing that future damages exceeding 
$150,000 be paid in periodic ~yments, with future damages lower than $150,000 awarded using 
periodic payments at the discretion of the court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § .60-3408 (1994) (providing 
that in medical malpractice liability actions where there are damages for future economic losses, 
the verdict must specify a period of time over which payment for such losses will be made). 
355. Symposium, Reforming Punitive Damages.· The Punitive Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 469, 469 (2001) (discussing a public symposium held by the Harvard Journal on 
Legislation in March 2001 titled "Refonning Punitive Damages"). The issues at the core of the 
punitive damages debate include (a) the theoretical purpose of such damages, (b) disagreements 
over the empirical evidence, and (c) policy disagreements over whether there should be refonns 
of punitive damage law. /d. at 470. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring the Deterrent 
Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 347 (1998) (responding to Viscusi's article on the social 
costs of punitive damages cited below); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive 
Damages; An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV~ 743 (2002) (comparing data on punitive 
damages imposed by judges and juries); Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of 
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. I (introducing articles that were the product of a 
conference on the future of punitive damages); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the 
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998) (commenting on and providing an 
alternative to the analysis of punitive damages by Polinsky and Shaven cited below); David 
Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359 (1998) (criticizing Viscusi's 
article on the social costs of punitive damages cited below); M. Stuart Madden, Renegade 
Conduct and Punitive Damages in Tort, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1175 (2002) (reviewing the-matrix in 
which punitive damages exist and the availability of punitive damage awards in several states); 
Paul Magin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179 
( 1998) (considering whether in federal cases judges rather than juries should detennine the level 
of punitive damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
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relatively infrequent basis in civil litigation, substantial verdicts that 
receive wide publicity have generated controversy.356 In addition to 
court decisions circumscribing the situations where punitive damages 
are available, legislatures have employed statutory provisions to limit 
their scope and use.357 
There are several ways statutory provisions limiting the availability 
of punitive damages in veterinary malpractice cases could be drafted. 
The trigger for punitive damages could be raised from the standard of 
willful, wanton, or gross misconduct to a standard requiring that the 
veterinarian defendant have "actual malice."358 The evidentiary burden 
of proof for punitive damages could be set at a standard of "clear and 
convincing evidence."359 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (setting forth principles for detennining when punitive 
damages should be awarded and at what levels); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive 
Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002) 
(analyzing the empirical literature on punitive damages and the impact of punitive damage 
refonn); David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive Damage Assessment, 
39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121 (2002) (discussing the assessment of punitive damages using 
management theory); W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: The Social Costs of Punitive Damages 
Against Corporations in Environmental .and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998) (proposing the 
abolishment of punitive damages in environmental and product liability cases); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 ( 1998) (replying to critics of his 
article on punitive damages and providing additional infonnation supporting his argument against 
punitive damages). 
356. George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts To Understand It (discussing punitive 
damages generally and the controversy surrounding punitive damages), in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
How JURIES DECIDE 1-3 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002); Galanter, supra note 75, at 744-48 
(citing to one study that found that "virtually all" television coverage was triggered if a verdict 
had an "unusually large" punitive damage awards). Note that the media has reported several 
cases that have discussed significant monetary awards for injury or death to animals. Julie 
Scelfo, Good Dogs~ Bad Medicine? More Pet Owners Sue for Malpractice and Win, NEWSWEEK, 
May 21, 2001, at 52 (stating that a 1997 Kentucky jury awarded $15,000 to the owner of a 
German shepherd that bled to death from a botched surgery, and that a California judge in 2000 
awarded $27,699 to a woman for the suffering of her dog resulting from bungled dental repairs). 
357. Cf COLO. REv. STAT.§ 13-64-302.5 (2003) (limiting availability of exemplary damages 
in medical malpractice cases); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115 (2002) (stating that punitive, 
exemplary, vindictive, or aggravated damages are not allowed in healing-art and legal malpractice 
cases); Peck et al., supra note 113, at 411-13 (discussing statutory restrictions on punitive 
damages under Florida law); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run WildH: 
Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1012-34 (1999) 
(proposing refonns for punitive damages). 
358. Schwartz et al., supra note 357, at 1009, 1013 (discussing the use of different standards 
for the imposition of punitive damages and proposing the use of an "actual malice" trigger, 
stating that although such a trigger is more conservative than what is currently the law in most 
states, it would "help separate conduct that is particularly reprehensible and worthy of 
punishment from that which is not"). 
359. /d. at 1013-14 (stating that this standard is now law in twenty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia and is the recommendation of principal academic groups that have analyzed the 
issue over the last ten years). 
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Providing for caps or proportionality on punitive damages is also an 
option for legislatures.360 States could implement special pleading rules 
for claims that include punitive damages.361 Although it appears that 
punitive damages in veterinary malpractice cases will likely be imposed 
infrequently, providing certainty in the form of a cap may assuage the 
fears of those concerned about runaway verdicts.362 
3. Safeguards for Veterinarians 
It is possible to include safeguards in any veterinary malpractice act 
to reduce the likelihood that spurious claims will be brought against 
veterinarians. These types of safeguards are commonly found in 
medical liability acts, but unless there is specific statutory language, 
courts have found that they do not apply to veterinarians.363 In creating 
these types of safeguards, legislatures have balanced the needs of 
physicians and patients. If non-economic damages become available 
for the loss of animals, veterinarians should receive similar 
consideration. 
360. /d. at 1014-19 (discussing proportionality and state statutes that limit punitive damage 
awards). Setting the cap of punitive damages as a multiple of the economic or non-economic 
damages is one option. /d. at 1015-16. Bifurcating a trial involving punitive damages and 
excluding evidence of a defendant's net worth are also possible refonns proposed to bring more 
"equity" in punitive damage awards. /d. at 1018-19. 
361. Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 
NEB. L. REv. 412, 42a-21, 433-35 (1999) (discussing special pleadings for punitive damages 
requests in Aorida and other states). 
362. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text (discussing the limited number of 
veterinary malpractice cases involving punitive damages); cf Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling 
Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 15, 50 (discussing a 
study of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases that found that these types of damages 
were "generally awarded appropriately to punish the most egregious medical malpractice 
abuses ... [involving] ... extreme deviation from professional standards of care"). Rustad also 
found that there were "hot spots" in medical malpractice litigation that formed the bulk of 
punitive damages awarded in medical malpractice cases. /d. at 34. Rustad cites a 1995 study by 
the Justice Department that found that the "rate and size of punitive damage awards varies by 
substantive field of law,'' with the rate of punitive damages of three percent in medical 
malpractice cases. /d. at 27. Note that courts generally refuse to enforce contracts to provide 
insurance coverage for punitive damages. Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive 
Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101, 101. Although punitive damages then would not impact 
malpractice insurance rates, individual veterinarians would bear the economic impact of punitive 
damages. This supports the objective of providing deterrence for egregious behavior but also 
illustrates the need for caution in allowing punitive damages. 
363. E.g., Neasbitt v. Warren, 22 S.W.3d 107, 108 (2000) (finding that the Texas Medical 
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act does not apply to veterinarians). 
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a. Standard of Care 
A statutory provision could set forth the requisite standards of 
practice for veterinarians in those states where case law has not 
established an applicable standard of care, and where the standard of 
care needs clarification.364 Obviously, a state providing that the locality 
rule applies would set a lower standard of care than a state that provides 
for the application of a universal rule for all veterinarians. As discussed 
above, the trend of recent cases rejects the locality rule, given the 
widespread accessibility of infortrtation on new and improved 
treatments for animals.365 As with physicians who are specialists, 
veterinarians who hold themselves out as specialists for a species or a 
type of treatment should be held to the standard of such specialists.366 
Setting a standard of care of gross negligence or reckless or intentional 
misconduct prior to civil liability in emergency situations exists by 
statute in some states and should be adopted if not already 
established. 367 
364. Cf. ALA .. CODE§ 6-5-548 (1993 & Supp. 2003); id. § 6-5-549 (stating that the minimum 
standard of proof in medical malpractice cases shall be proof by substantial evidence); id. § 6-5-
572 (1993) (setting out the standard of care in legal service liability actions); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 766.102 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (setting the standard of care as that of similar health care . 
providers); MICH. COMP~ LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (West 2000) (setting the standard of practice 
for physicians in medical malpractice cases); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2810 (1998) (providing that 
the standard of care in medical malpractice cases be that of health care providers in the same or 
similar communities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2003) (providing a standard of care for 
medical malpractice actions as that of professionals situated in the same or similar communities); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (setting the standard of practice for medical 
malpractice cases and assigning of the burdens of proof); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908 (2002) 
(providing that health care professionals must meet the standard of care exercised by prudent 
health care professionals engaged in similar practices under the same or similar circumstances). 
365. See supra notes 135-69 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of care in 
veterinary malpractice cases). Note that another option is to provide that the standard of care be 
set by veterinarians in the community or in similar communities. This standard may still result in 
a lower standard of care, but plaintiffs have access to a greater pool of possible experts. 
366. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (setting the standard of practice for 
physicians in medical malpractice cases and providing that specialists will be held to the standard 
of care of other specialists in the community or similar communities); see also supra note 18 and 
accompanying text (discussing the growing number of veterinarians specializing in areas of 
treatment). 
367. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (2002) (stating that a veterinarian providing emergency care 
to an injured or sick animal will not be liable for civil damages as a result of the care, but not 
precluding liability for civil damages as a result of gross negligence or reckless or intentional 
misconduct); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.18826 (2000) (providing protection from liability 
for civil damages in situations where animals have been brought to a veterinarian by someone 
other than their owners, but stating that the section would not apply if acts amount to gross 
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct); OR. REV. STAT. § 686.440 (200 1) (providing 
immunity from civil liability for emergency treatment of animals under certain circumstances and 
stating that the section does not apply to acts that constitute gross negligence). 
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Similar to setting the standard of care, a statutory provision could 
provide for a special burden of proof prior to recovery. In any 
malpractice case, the plaintiff will have the burden of showing that the 
injury claimed was proximately caused by the act or omission of the 
professional.368 An example of a special burden of proof could consist 
of a requirement that the plaintiff would not recover unless the plaintiff 
shows that but for the defendant's negligence, there was a greater than 
50% chance of survival or a better result.369 
Another option is to statutorily circumscribe causes of action to 
specific situations. An example of this would be limiting actions based 
on lack of infortned consent to non-emergency treatments and 
articulating defenses that can be used for claims based on a lack of 
informed consent.370 
b. Screening Panel 
A measure that can be required before or after the filing of a 
malpractice action is the convening of a screening or review panei.371 
The membership of the panel would be designated by statute and would 
generally consist of attorneys and, in the case of veterinary malpractice, 
licensed veterinarians.372 The screening panel's purpose is to provide 
recommendations on the issue of whether the professional has met the 
368. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a cause of action 
for a veterinary malpractice action). 
369. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a(2) (setting forth the burden for plaintiffs in 
medical malpractice cases). The specific language in the Michigan statute is: "In an action 
alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or 
an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%." /d. 
370. Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 1997) (providing a presumption that informed 
consent was given in medial or surgical procedures if statutory requirements are met); NEB. REv. 
STAT.§ 44-2820 (1998) (setting forth the burden of proof in actions based on the failure to obtain 
informed consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (2003) (setting forth specific standards for the 
recovery of damages for claims based on the lack of informed consent of a patient or the patient's 
representatives); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2002) (limiting medical, dental, 
and podiatric malpractice actions based on lack of infonned consent and providing defenses to 
such actions); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4401-a (McKinney 1992) (providing for a motion for 
judgment during a trial for medical malpractice based solely on lack of informed consent if there 
has not been expert medical testimony supponing the insufficiency of the consent); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 677.097 (2001) (setting forth the procedure to obtain patients' informed consent); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (2002) (limiting medical malpractice actions based on lack of 
inforrned consent to specified circumstances). 
371. Cf KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3502 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (discussing a screening panel for 
professional liability actions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840 (1998) (setting forth rules relating to 
medical review panels for medical malpractice claims). 
372. Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3502 (discussing membership selection of screening panels for 
professional liability actions). 
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applicable standard of care.373 Unlike the activities of a mediator or 
mediation panel, the written report of a screening panel would be 
admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding, and the panel members 
could be called as witnesses at such a proceeding. 374 
c. Special Pleading Rules 
Another safeguard for veterinarians is to implement special pleading 
rules for malpractice claims. Generally, these standards require the 
pleading of additional facts or set notice or certificate of merit 
requirements. 375 
One option is to require special notice before the filing of a veterinary 
m'l.lpractice claim. 376 An analogous example in medical malpractice 
claims is found in Michigan law, which requires that a plaintiff file a 
notice setting forth a factual statement of the claim up to 182 days prior 
to the filing of a suit based on such facts.377 The statute then provides 
for access to records and a time for the defendants to respond to the 
allegations.378 These types of notice provisions encourage the 
settlement of malpractice claims prior to formallitigation.379 
Another example of a special pleading rule is the requirement that a 
"certificate of review" be filed with any claim for negligence against a 
veterinarian.380 The purposes of such certificates include the reduction 
373. Cf. id. 
374. Cf id. 
375. Parness et al., supra note 361, at 413. 
376. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 364 (1982) (providing that at least ninety days' notice must 
be given to a health care provider prior to the commencement of litigation based on such 
provider's professional negligence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106 (1997 & West Supp. 2003) 
(requiring at least ninety days notice prior to filing suit for medical malpractice claims); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912b (West 2000) (setting forth a notice requirement for plaintiffs in 
medical malpractice cases). 
377. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2912b. 
378. /d. 
379~ Roberts v. Mecosta County Gen. Hosp. 610 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), 
rev'd, 642 N.W.2d 663 (Mich. 2002). 
380. Colorado law requires that such a certificate be filed for claims against any licensed 
professional based on negligence. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2003). New Jersey also 
requires that an affidavit be filed in actions based on malpractice by licensed persons, including 
veterinarians. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000) (referring to licensed persons in 
section 2A:53A-26, which includes accountants, architects, attorneys, engineers, physicians, and 
veterinarians). Other states require certificates of review in professional negligence actions, but 
the laws do not encompass claims against veterinarians. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 
1997 & Supp. 2004) (requiring attorneys filing medical negligence actions to-certify that there 
has been a reasonable investigation into the grounds for the complaint); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 544.42 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (re,quiring certification of expert review in malpractice 
actions against professionals, defined as, attorney, architects, certified public accountants, 
engineers, land surveyors, and landscape architects); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 2000) 
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of frivolous claims and the protection of the defendant from reputational 
harm.381 These certificates typically require plaintiffs to show that they 
have "consulted a person who has expertise in the area of the alleged 
negligent conduct, and the expert has concluded that the claim is 
meritorious."382 Any certificate or "affidavit of merit" could require the 
professional serving as the plaintiff's expert to state that the applicable 
standard of care was breached, set forth the specific actions that should 
have been taken or omitted, and provide information on how the actions 
or inactions caused the injury.383 A parallel requirement could be 
established for the defendants of veterinary malpractice actions in which 
the defendant must provide an affidavit of meritorious defense.384 In 
the alternative, a state could require that a bond be filed or cash be 
placed in an escrow account for each professional named in the 
action.385 
(providing that an affidavit must be filed no later than 90 days after the filing of the ·petition and 
that the plaintiff shall obtain the written opinion of a legally qualified health care provider); NEV. 
REv. STAT. ANN. 4lA.071 (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring that an affidavit by a medical expert 
be included with any filing in any actions for medical malpractice filed in the district court); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991) (providing that a complaint in a medical, dental, or podiatric 
malpractice actions must be accompanied by a certificate, executed by the attorney, that includes, 
among other things, certification that the attorney has consulted with one professional in the area 
where the alleged malpractice has occurred and that there is a reasonable basis for the 
commencement of such an action, or that such consultation should be excused). See generally 
Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates 
of Merit?, BYU L. REv. 537 (.1997) (discussing the effectiveness of special certificates of merit). 
Certificates of merit have also been required in other professional malpractice claims, and in 
product liability claims and certain sexual abuse claims. ld. at 539; see also Parness et al., supra 
note 361, at 416-20 (discussing special pleading rules in professional malpractice cases). 
381. Parness & Leonetti, supra note 380, at 541 _,52 (discussing rationales for special 
certificates of merit and proposing changes to statutes); see also Leo, supra note 104, at 1404-05 
(stating that a purpose of the Minnesota statutory provision requiring an affidavit of expert review 
is "to reduce the cost of medical insurance by preventing frivolous medical malpractice claims''). 
382. Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114, 115 n.2 (Colo. 2001) (citing to the failure of a 
client to file a certificate of review in connection with a counterclaim based on a veterinarian's 
professional negligence as support for the dismissal of such counterclaim). 
383. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.29l2d (West 2000) (setting forth an affidavit of 
merit requirement for plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases). 
384. Cf. id. § 600.2912e (setting forth an obligation of defendants in medical malpractice 
actions to provide an affidavit of meritorious defense). 
385. Cf TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (repealed 2003) (providing for bond 
or escrow in lieu of filing an expert report pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance 
Improvement Act). This act has been found not to apply to veterinarians. Neasbitt v. Warren, 22 
S.W.3d 107, 112 (Tex. 2000). 
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To ensure prompt action by clients in filing their claims, states could 
pass a special statute of limitations for veterinary malpractice claims, 
requiring them to be brought earlier than other negligence claims.386 
d. Other Safeguards 
It is not always clear whether expressions of sympathy or gestures in 
the form of apologies are admissible in court.387 Because of this 
uncertainty, veterinarians and their staffs may be cautious about 
expressing their sorrow after the death of an animal under their care. 
There is evidence that many lawsuits arise out of anger resulting from 
the "failure of another party to express regret or sympathy."388 
Clarifying veterinarians' or their staff members' ability to express 
sympathy may reduce the likelihood that a malpractice suit will be 
filed.389 
In order to ensure that expert witnesses in veterinary malpractice 
actions have a realistic view of the practice, a provision could include a 
requirement that any such expert witness must have devoted a 
percentage of his or her professional time, within a period preceding the 
incident, to clinical practice. 390 
Although the percentage of animals covered by health insurance in 
the United States is still quite low, just as in other types of litigation, a 
veterinarian who is held liable for malpractice should be allowed to 
introduce evidence of insurance coverage in order to reduce the amount 
of veterinary fees the veterinarian may have to reimburse.391 
386. Cf Leo, supra note 104, at 1404 (stating that "[n]early every state has a special statute of 
limitations for medical negligence claims"). 
387. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1160 cmt. (West Supp. 2004). 
388. /d. 
389. /d.; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 230 (Law. Co-op 2000) (providing that under 
certain circumstances, statements expressing sympathy will be inadmissible as evidence of an 
admission of liability in civil actions); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 
Supp. 2004) (setting forth restrictions on the admission of communications of sympathy in civil 
actions) . 
390. Cf COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-401 (2003) (setting forth the qualifications required of 
expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.139 (West 1997) 
(setting forth expert witness standards in medical malpractice cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3412 ( 1994) (providing that expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions to have spent at least 
fifty percent of their professional time in clinic practice within the two years preceding the 
incident at issue); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-l, R. 702 (2003) (setting forth the criteria for expert 
witnesses in medical malpractice actions and requiring that such experts have spent a majority of 
their time teaching or in active practice during the year immediately preceding the action alleged). 
391. Cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (1997 & West Supp. 2004) (setting forth the right of a 
defendant in a medical malpractice action to bring evidence of benefits paid and the right of a 
plaintiff in such an action to introduce evidence of the costs incurred to secure his or her rights to 
such benefits). 
548 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 35 
Finally, it is also possible to require the trier of fact to articulate how 
the damages were calculated, distinguishing between economic and 
non-economic damages, which would force judges or juries to justify 
their damage awards.392 Presumably, given the low economic value of 
most animals, the bulk of any damage award for veterinary malpractice 
in a jurisdiction that allowed for non-economic damages would be for 
these damages. 
4. Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
It may also be appropriate to encourage the greater use of alternative 
forms of dispute resolution in these cases.393 There is concern that 
alternative methods of dispute resolution may be abused when applied 
to disputes between consumers and providers of goods and services.394 
Notwithstanding this concern, in situations where alternatives such as 
binding arbitration have been agreed upon by the parties, such 
procedures should be supported.395 
392. Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-204 (2003) (providing that special damages findings are 
required for certain tort claims); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706 (2002) (requiring special 
findings in medical malpractice case damages); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 1997) 
(providing for the articulation of various damages recovered for medical malpractice cases). 
393. Scoggins, supra note 95, at 986; see also Harold W. Hannah, Reducing Your Malpractice 
Vulnerability, 209 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1859, 1859 (1996) (discussing the use of 
alternative forms of dispute resolution and other ways veterinarians can reduce their vulnerability 
to malpractice claims). The largest insurer of veterinarians, the AVMA's PLIT, has not been 
involved in any fonnalized ADR program. Shirbroun Interview, supra note 93. 
394. See Jean R. Stemlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding 
Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J. 8, (1997) (discussing impact of court decisions that allow 
companies to impose binding arbitration agreements on consumers); Jean R. Stemlight, 
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A 
Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. 
REv. 1 ( 1997) (challenging the assumption that binding arbitration raises no constitutional 
concerns). Other issues raised by the decreasing percentage of cases that go to trial is the lack of 
decisions that can be used as precedent, the impact on the right to trial by jury, and isolation of 
the justice system from the public. Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
2002, at 24, 26 (2002). 
395. All types of alternative dispute resolution can produce binding results, however, only 
agreements to arbitrate can bind parties entering into them before disputes arise. STEPHEN J. 
WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-8 (2001). But see KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, 
MEDIATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 57 (2d ed. 2000) (stating that "it currently appears that 
most courts will enforce voluntary mediation clauses"). There is also specific statutory support 
for binding arbitration in the context of medical malpractice actions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1295 (West 1982) (providing for specific language on any contract for medical services 
containing a binding arbitration clause); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403 (2003) (setting forth 
circumstances under which binding arbitration procedures for medical malpractice claims will not 
be deemed contrary to the public policy of the state); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207 (West 1997 & 
Supp. 2004) (setting forth rules relating to voluntary binding arbitration of medical negligence 
claims); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.20 (2002) (providing that medical malpractice disputes 
subject to arbitration will be binding on insurance companies); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
• 
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Given the emotional nature of a claim, often arising out of the death 
of an animal, mediation could play an essential role in reducing the 
number of claims that are litigated.396 Mediation in medical 
malpractice actions often utilizes specific statutory provisions reflecting 
the interests of all parties.397 For example, in Michigan, rather than 
having one or two mediators conduct a mediation, a five-member panel 
consisting of three attorneys and two medical professionals controls 
mediation.398 Given the considerably lower dollar value of veterinary 
malpractice cases, a single mediator or three-member panels may be 
more appropriate. Given the expertise of current members of boards of 
veterinary practice, such board members could be called upon to act on 
such panels. 
Although mediation is non-binding by its very nature, it is possible to 
establish consequences for any future litigation arising out of the 
mediation.399 As an example, a unanimous panel could determine that 
an action or defense is frivolous and without merit, and any party 
raising such an action or defense at trial could be required to post a 
bond; if judgment is entered against the party posting the bond, the bond 
could be used for payment of costs incurred by the other parties 
responding to the action or defense deemed frivolous.400 
Another consequence of a party rejecting a unanimous mediation 
panel could be the requirement that the "losing" party, which rejected 
§ 600.2912g (West 2000) (providing for binding arbitration in claims of medical malpractice 
when the alleged damages are less than $75,000 and setting forth specific rules relating to such 
arbitration proceeding); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 21-258-3 (Michie 1987) (providing for a warning 
clause in agreements to arbitrate for medical malpractice cases); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 
(2002) (validating voluntary arbitration in medical malpractice actions). 
396. KOVACH, supra note 395, at 48-49 (discussing the role of emotions in the mediation 
process); WILSON, supra note 14, at 119 (reporting that according to sources at the California 
State Board, 50 to 70% of grievances relate to the death of an animal). 
397. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 600.4903-.4923 (West 2000) (setting forth the procedures 
for a medical malpractice mediation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.11 (West 2000) (requiring parties 
to discuss and determine whether a form of ADR is appropriate in each medical malpractice 
case); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.42-.61 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003) (setting forth a mediation 
system in medical malpractice cases and providing for a three-member panel consisting of a 
public member, an attorney, and a health care provider). 
398. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4905. 
399. The consequences can be informal, such as the psychological benefits of having your 
case reviewed by an outsider prior to litigation, or formal, as described below. Court ordered 
non-binding arbitration is also possible. Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.107 (1997 & West Supp. 
2004) (providing for non-binding arbitration for medical negligence cases at the motion of either 
party). 
400. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4915 (providing for evaluation and awards by a 
panel in medical malpractice mediation). 
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an evaluation, be required to pay the costs of the other party~401 Even if 
"mandatory mediation" is not included in a statutory provision, there 
could be a requirement that a settlement conference be held before the 
matter goes to trial.402 
The use of alternative fom1s of dispute resolution would require the 
support of the veterinary community at large, but the adoption of such 
dispute resolution systems has occurred in other professions, with some 
degree of success.403 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current system is not ideal, either for veterinarians or their 
clients. Veterinarians are now feeling the pressure of an increasing 
number of claims with the po-ssibility of significant damage awards. 
Not knowing the outer limit of the damages that could occur if a suit is 
successful makes it difficult to detennine the appropriate pricing and 
coverage of malpractice insurance. Malpractice insurance costs will 
increase as companies try to stay ahead of potential claims.. Increased 
insurance costs will then likely cause increased prices for the services 
that veterinarians provide possibly pricing some clients out of the 
market and limiting access to necessary medical services for their 
animals. From a client's perspective, the damages currently available in 
many jurisdictions do not reflect the value of these animals-
. . . 
economically or otherwise. Limiting damages to economic value also 
fails to support the general tort goals of deterrence of wrongful acts, 
appropriate compensation of victims, and affirmation of societal values. 
Given the current legal status -of animals as personal property, 
without considerable judicial activism or the adoption of legislation, it is 
401. Cf id. § 600.4921 (adjusting costs ifthere has been a rejection of a unanimous panel 
evaluation in medical malpractice mediation). 
402. Cf ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(c) (providing for comprehensive pretrial conferences in medical 
malpractice cases and requiring that a date be set for a mandatory settlement conference); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 766.108 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (requiring mandatory settlement conferences 
in medical malpractice actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3413 (1994) (requiring settlement 
conferences in medical malpractice actions); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.081 (Michie Supp. 
2003) (requiring settlement conferences in actions for medical malpractice). 
403. See KOVACH, supra note 395, at 352 (discussing the use of mediation in the resolution of 
attorney-client disputes). See generally id. at 339-57 (discussing specialized applications of 
mediation). Mediation has been proposed as an alternative to veterinary disputes in Canada. 
Elizabeth Saul, To Litigate or Mediate, That Is the Question!, 40 CAN. VET. J. 243, 243 (1999) 
(discussing mediation as an alternative to litigation in veterinary disputes). Mediation is already 
used in other disputes relating to animals. Quentin Hardy, If Things Get Catty in Marin County, 
Police Call Ms. Greer: A Pet Mediator, She Referees Dogged Animal Disputes; Ruff Justice for 
Rocky, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1997, at AI (discussing the use of a pet mediator to deal both with 
disputes between neighbors and custody disputes), available at 1997 WL-WSJ 2423244. 
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unlikely that there will be widespread establishment of standards that 
allow clients to be compensated at something other than a fair market 
value of their companion animals in the near future. Every legislative 
session provides an opportunity for organizations concerned about 
animal welfare and the relationship between humans and their animals 
to propose new statutory language. Adoption of such legislation is 
controversial. It is good public policy to have laws that reflect the 
changing nature of the relationship between people and their animals, 
but such laws must consider the impact on the health of animals overall. 
A balanced approach that provides for capped non-economic damages is 
an important starting point in recognizing the changed status of these 
animals in our society while also encouraging professionals to continue 
providing quality veterinary care. 
• 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE404 
Definitions As used in this Section , unless the context otherwise 
• 
requtres: 
(1) "Animal-companion" means a dog, cat, or any warm-blooded 
domesticated nonhuman animal that is owned or kept by a person 
primarily for purposes of companionship. 
(2) "Owner" means the legal owner of an animal-companion and the 
people residing in the Owner's household who have a demonstrable 
bond with the animal-companion. 
(3) "Veterinarian" means a person who has received a doctoral 
degree in veterinary medicine or its equivalent from a school of 
veterinary medicine and is licensed to practice pursuant to [cross 
citation to veterinary licensing section]. 
( 4) "Veterinary service" means a service or procedure included 
within the practice of veterinary medicine, as defined in [cross citation 
to veterinary practice act]. 
Damages for Harm Resulting from Veterinary Malpractice 
(1) If it is proven, in a civil action, that a veterinarian has through 
negligent veterinary practice, performance, or prescription of veterinary 
services, caused the injury or death of an animal-companion, the 
animal-companion's Owner may recover the damages described in this 
subsection . 
(2) Economic damages may be recovered for the fair monetary value 
of the animal-companion, veterinary costs and fees, and reasonable 
burial expenses of the deceased animal-companion. 
(3) Non-economic damages may be recovered for the loss of the 
reasonably expected society, companionship, comfort, protection, and 
services of the animal-companion as well as the pain, suffering, and 
emotional distress sustained by the Owner. 
404. This statutory language is derived in part from a variety of sources. See TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000) (providing for damages of up to $4000 for the emotional distress 
caused by the loss of a pet because of the negligent act of another); H.R. 03-1260, 64th Gen. 
Assem. (Colo. 2003) (proposing damages for harm from negligent veterinary practices as well as 
cruelty to animals); H.R. 932, 183rd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) (providing for non-
economic and capped punitive damages for the tortious injury or killing of a companion animal); 
H.R. 7610, 224th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (allowing for damages of up to $5000 in a 
proposed bill); W aisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 71-73 (proposing legislation providing a 
general remedy for people whose companion animals have been wrongfully injured). 
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(4) Any award of non-economic damages under this section may not 
exceed twenty-five thousands dollars ($25,000). 

